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The Equifax Data Breach: An Opportunity to 
Improve Consumer Protection and 
Cybersecurity Efforts in America 
GREGORY S. GAGLIONE, JR.† 
INTRODUCTION 
“Identity theft is not a joke, Jim! Millions of families 
suffer every year!”1 Although this statement by Dwight 
Schrute in an episode of The Office was intended to be a joke, 
given the recent rise in data breaches, it is a reality to many 
Americans today. A combined 200 million individuals were 
affected by the Equifax and Uber data breaches alone in 
2017.2 In total, over 2.5 billion records were compromised in 
 
†J.D., 2019, University at Buffalo School of Law; M.B.A., 2019 University at 
Buffalo School of Management; B.A., Economics, 2015, University at Buffalo; 
Publications Editor, Buffalo Law Review; Certified Information Privacy 
Professional/United States. I am grateful for my colleagues at the Buffalo Law 
Review for their time and effort editing this Comment. Special thanks goes to my 
family and friends for their support and encouragement, especially my fiancé 
Theresa Johnson. Without their love and support, this Comment would not be 
possible. 
 1. The Office: Product Recall (NBC television broadcast April 26, 2007). 
 2. See Mike Isaac et al., Uber Hid 2016 Breach, Paying Hackers to Delete 
Stolen Data, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/21/ 
technology/uber-hack.html; Equifax Inc., Equifax Announces Cybersecurity 
Incident Involving Consumer Information, EQUIFAX (Sept. 7, 2017), 
https://investor.equifax.com/news-and-events/news/2017/09-07-2017-213000628 
[hereinafter EQUIFAX]. 
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publicly disclosed data breaches in 2017.3 That number is 
likely to increase in 2018 due to the massive data breaches 
at Facebook4, Marriott5, and Under Armour.6 However, even 
though there has been a substantial increase in data 
breaches over the past few years,7 the legal system has not 
evolved to provide protections for consumers.  
Currently, circuit courts are divided over whether the 
risk of future harm that data breach victims incur is enough 
to establish an injury-in-fact for Article III standing.8 
Additionally, in 2018, Alabama and South Dakota became 
the final two states to pass a data breach notification law.9 
 
 3. See GEMALTO, FINDINGS FROM THE 2017 BREACH LEVEL INDEX 2, GEMALTO 
(2018), https://blog.gemalto.com/security/2018/04/13/data-breach-stats-for-2017-
full-year-results-are-in/ (stating that over 2.5 billion records were breached in 
2017, which is up 88% from 2016). 
 4. Mike Isaac & Sheera Frenkel, Facebook Security Breach Exposes Accounts 
of 50 Million Users, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/09/28/technology/facebook-hack-data-breach.html. Facebook announced in 
September that “an attack on its computer networked exposed the personal 
information of nearly 50 million users.” 
 5. Seena Gressin, The Marriott data breach, F.T.C. (Dec. 4, 2018), 
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2018/12/marriott-data-breach. Marriott 
International announced in November 2018 that a breach of its guest reservation 
database exposed the personal information of up to 500 million people. 
 6. Lisa Marie Segarra, Under Armour Data Breach Exposes 150 Million 
MyFitnessPal Accounts, TIME (Mar. 30, 2018), http://time.com/5222015/under-
armour-myfitnesspal-data-breach/. In March 2018 Under Armour announced 
that there was a security breach with Under Armour’s MyFitnessPal system 
affecting 150 million users. 
 7. See Herb Weisbaum, Data Breaches Happening at Record Pace, Report 
Finds, NBC NEWS (July 24, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/business/consumer/ 
data-breaches-happening-record-pace-report-finds-n785881. 
 8. Dominic Spinelli, Data Breach Standing: Recent Decisions Show Growing 
Circuit Split, ABA (January 26, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/ 
young_lawyers/publications/the_101_201_practice_series/data_breach_standing
_recent_decisions_show_gowing_circuit_court_split/. See also Bradford C. Mank, 
Data Breaches Identity Theft, and Article III Standing: Will the Supreme Court 
Resolve the Split in the Circuits?, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1323, 1328 (2017) 
(advocating for the Supreme Court to address this circuit split). 
 9. See EMILY WESTRIDGE BLACK ET AL., Key Features of New Data Breach 
Notification Laws in Alabama and South Dakota, 4(5) PRATT’S PRIVACY AND 
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With these two new data breach notification statutes, there 
are now fifty separate state data breach notification laws.10 
These laws differ in complexity and severity, making it 
difficult for companies to comply with all fifty notification 
statutes when a breach occurs.11 As a result, many data 
breach victims are completely unaware that their personal 
information is in the hands of hackers because either their 
state data breach notification law is not strict enough, or a 
company simply has failed to comply with the state law and 
notify all the individuals involved in the breach.12 In short, 
the law currently does not offer the proper protections for 
 
CYBERSECURITY LAW REPORT  139, 147 (2018). 
 10. Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES (Sept. 29, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications 
-and-information-technology/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx [hereinafter 
NCSL](providing a list of all fifty state data breach notification laws). 
 11. Bart A. Lazar, Security Breach Responses: As Important and Difficult as 
Ever, CYBER L. & STRATEGY (June 8, 2018) at 6 (explaining the material 
differences in notification statutes including “the definition of personal 
information covered by the statute; the definition of a breach; exceptions for 
providing notice because of the lack of materiality or risk of harm associated with 
the breach; whether and to the extent encrypted data is exempted from a breach; 
timing requirements for providing notice to individuals; the contents of a notice;” 
etc. The many material differences between the notification statutes creates 
“confusion and the unnecessary expenditure of time and resources figuring out a 
company’s responsibilities, battles between companies and their service 
providers about whether a notification should be sent, who sends notifications, 
the content of the notification and when the notifications should be sent.”). 
 12. See Nicole Lyn Pesce, An Alarming Number of People Still Don’t Know if 
They Were Hurt by the Equifax Hack, MKT. WATCH (July 25, 2018), 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/an-alarming-number-of-people-still-dont-
know-if-they-were-hurt-by-the-equifax-hack-2018-07-25; Paul Roberts, For U.S. 
Consumers: Ignorance of Data Breaches is Bliss, DIGITAL GUARDIAN (Dec. 21, 
2017), https://digitalguardian.com/blog/us-consumers-ignorance-data-breaches-
bliss (explaining that the “U.S. lacks a comprehensive, federal data privacy and 
data protection law that compels firms to notify consumers when their 
information has been compromised” and the many state data breach notification 
laws does not provide a uniform standard, which makes the likelihood of learning 
of the theft of one’s information dependent in part on where one lives); Octavio 
Blanco, Millions of Consumers Still Unaware of Equifax Data Breach, CONSUMER 
REPORTS (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.consumerreports.org/consumer-protection/ 
millions-of-consumers-still-unaware-of-equifax-data-breach/.  
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consumers once their personal information has been hacked. 
The recent Equifax data breach in 2017 showcased the 
current cybersecurity problems in America today. This 
Comment will focus on the Equifax data breach and discuss 
the opportunity it presents to improve consumer protection 
and cybersecurity efforts in America. The Comment will 
argue for two fundamental changes to be made in American 
law. The first change requires action by the United States 
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court can use the Equifax 
data breach as an opportunity to clarify the current circuit 
split surrounding Article III standing for data breach class 
action cases. This Comment argues that the Supreme Court 
should follow the D.C., Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuit 
Courts’ recent rulings that allow for standing in a data 
breach case based on the risk of future harm.13 The second 
change in the law requires action from the United States 
Congress. This Comment proposes that Congress pass a 
federal privacy law that will protect consumer personal 
information and provide penalties for organizations that 
violate the law and harm consumers by putting their data at 
risk. These two changes in the law will act as general and 
specific deterrents for companies that fail to protect their 
customers’ personal information.14 With these laws in place 
as a deterrent, they will shape companies’ behavior to 
improve cybersecurity efforts that will then prevent future 
data breaches. In sum, these two changes to the law will 
incentivize organizations to improve their cybersecurity 
efforts and allow for better consumer protection before and 
after a data breach occurs. 
Part I of this Comment provides a historical background 
of data breaches, highlighting the prominent security 
breaches that occurred prior to 2019. Part II explains the 
 
 13. See Lee J. Plave & John W. Edson, First Steps in Data Privacy Cases: 
Article III Standing, 37 FRANCHISE L.J. 485, 485, 487 (2018). 
 14. See BRIAN T. FITZPATRICK, Do Class Actions Deter Wrongdoing?, in THE 
CLASS ACTION EFFECT (Catherine Piché, ed., Éditions Yvon Blais, Montreal, 
2018). 
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harmful effects data breaches have on companies, 
consumers, and the economy as a whole. Part III provides an 
in-depth evaluation of the Equifax data breach and how it 
provides an opportunity for America to learn from the breach 
to improve consumer protection and cybersecurity efforts. 
Part IV details the current circuit split regarding Article III 
standing in data breach class action cases, as well as an 
overview of the privacy laws enacted recently in the United 
States and abroad. Finally, Part V offers a proposed solution 
including both the Supreme Court addressing the circuit 
split and Congress passing a federal privacy law to improve 
consumer protection and cybersecurity efforts in America. 
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF DATA BREACHES 
The Cambridge Dictionary defines a data breach as “an 
occasion when private information can be seen by people who 
should not be able to see it.”15 Under this definition, the first 
recorded data breach, arguably, occurred in the Garden of 
Eden when Adam and Eve gained unauthorized access into 
the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil by eating an apple 
from the tree against God’s command.16 The legal definition 
of a data breach is “the loss, theft, or other unauthorized 
access . . . to data containing sensitive personal information, 
in electric or printed form, that results in the potential 
compromise of the confidentiality or integrity of the data.”17 
Still, under this definition, data breaches did not originate 
when companies began storing their data digitally. Before 
computing was commonplace, a data breach could constitute 
something as simple as viewing an individual’s medical file 
without authorization or finding sensitive documents that 
 
 15. Data Breach, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/ 
dictionary/english/data-breach (last visited Feb. 26, 2019). In this Comment the 
terms “data breach” and “security breach” are used interchangeably. 
 16. See Genesis 3:1–14. 
 17. 38 U.S.C. § 5727(4). 
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were not properly discarded.18 However, these pre-digital age 
data breaches were not nearly as prevalent as the data 
breaches seen today. Once data became digitized and stored 
in large quantities, data breaches became much more 
rampant. 
The advent of the internet and the digital age has made 
data19 more valuable than ever.20 Organizations now gather 
large amounts of customer personal information and use this 
information as an integral part of their business strategy.21 
At the same time, technological advancement also made it 
easier for cybercriminals to hack into an organization’s 
system.22 Indeed, as electronic data storage increased in the 
 
 18. David F. Perri & Erinmichelle D. Perri, Acknowledging the “M” in MIS: 
Managing a Data Breach Crisis, 19 J. OF THE ACAD. OF BUS. 9, 11 (2018). 
 19. Data is customer information for the purposes of this Comment. Data and 
personal information are used interchangeably throughout this Comment. 
 20. See The World’s Most Valuable Resource is No Longer Oil, But Data, THE 
ECONOMIST (May 6, 2017), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/05/06/the-
worlds-most-valuable-resource-is-no-longer-oil-but-data. See also James 
Grottola, Data is the World’s Most Valuable Resource, RINGLEAD (Dec. 4, 2017), 
https://www.ringlead.com/blog/data-is-the-worlds-most-valuable-resource/ 
(explaining why data is valuable in the business environment and the importance 
of protecting data). 
 21. James Grottola, Data is the World’s Most Valuable Resource, RINGLEAD 
(Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.ringlead.com/blog/data-is-the-worlds-most-valuable-
resource/ (claiming that 97 percent of businesses use data to power their business 
opportunities and 76 percent of businesses use data as an integral part of forming 
a business strategy); see also Adam C. Uzialko, How Businesses Are Collecting 
Data (And What They Are Doing with It), BUS. NEWS DAILY (Aug. 3, 2018), 
https://www.businessnewsdaily.com/10625-businesses-collecting-data.html 
(explaining that consumer data is often used by companies to improve their 
marketing strategy and customer experience. Some companies even collect data 
simply to sell to other companies). 
 22. See Andrew Rossow, Why Data Breaches Are Becoming More Frequent and 
What You Need to Do, FORBES (May 23, 2018, 3:12 PM), https://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/andrewrossow/2018/05/23/why-data-breaches-are-becoming-more-frequent 
-and-what-you-need-to-do/#570d20bcd97f; see also Juliana De Groot, The History 
of Data Breaches, DIGITAL GUARDIAN (Jan. 3, 2019), https://digitalguardian.com 
/blog/history-data-breaches. (explaining the four most common types of data 
breaches: ransomware, malware, phishing, and denial-of-service, all four of 
which use computer software to hack into computer systems). 
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1980s and 1990s, it inevitably led to more data breaches. As 
the world’s volume of data has been growing exponentially 
year after year, it has given cybercriminals “a greater 
opportunity to expose massive amounts of data in a single 
breach.”23 Therefore, with data more valuable than ever and 
technological innovation at an all-time high, 
cybercriminals24 now have the technological ability and a 
monetary incentive to hack into an organization’s 
information system and steal the personal information of 
millions of Americans.25 
The first reported digital data breach was the AOL data 
breach in 2004, where a twenty-four-year-old AOL employee 
stole 92 million customer email addresses and screen names 
with the intention of selling the information to bulk 
emailers.26 As a result, AOL users received excess spam from 
those who had purchased their emails and usernames.27 
Around the same time as the AOL breach, public awareness 
of the potential for data breaches began to rise. 
Consequently, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse,28 a non-profit 
 
 23. De Groot, supra note 22. 
 24. In this Comment, “cybercriminals” and “hackers” are used 
interchangeably. 
 25. See Vivek Sharma, Why Do Data Breaches Happen?, USC MARSHALL SCH. 
OF BUS. (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.marshall.usc.edu/blog/why-do-data-
breaches-happen. (explaining that after a massive data breach, cybercriminals 
will sell the stolen data to other criminals who will use it to make fraudulent 
purchases). 
 26. Davis Stout, AOL Engineer Sold 92 Million Names to Spammer, U.S. 
Says, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/23/ 
technology/aol-engineer-sold-92-million-names-to-spammer-us-says.html. See 
also Meg Krafft, A Brief History of Data Breaches, THE SEC. AWARENESS CO. (Mar. 
6, 2018), https://www.thesecurityawarenesscompany.com/2018/03/06/brief-
history-data-breaches/. 
 27. Krafft, supra note 26. Luckily, passwords and credit card numbers were 
not breached, leaving this data breach less harmful than the Equifax data breach 
and others that have occurred recently. 
 28. Privacy Rights Clearinghouse is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization 
protecting privacy for all by empowering individuals and advocating for positive 
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organization advocating for privacy protection, began 
recording and gathering information on data breaches in 
2005. 
The year 2005 also became infamous as the year of the 
first data breach to compromise more than 1 million records 
when DSW Shoe Warehouse had 1.4 million credit card 
numbers and names on accounts hacked.29 In the same year, 
the first data breach to affect a college campus occurred when 
George Mason University was breached in January of 2005 
where names, pictures, and Social Security numbers of 
32,000 students and staff were exposed to hackers.30 
Since 2005, data breaches have become larger and more 
dangerous with each passing year. Accordingly, in 2009, the 
first breach to involve over 100 million records was recorded 
when Heartland Payment Systems experienced a breach 
that exposed 130 million credit card accounts.31 Following 
the Heartland breach, data breaches continued to reach new 
heights. In 2013, Target was involved in a highly-publicized 
 
change. Clearinghouse, About Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, PRIVACY RIGHTS 
CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.privacyrights.org/about. In total, Privacy Rights 
Clearinghouse reports that there have been over 11 billion records breached from 
over 9,000 data breaches made public from 2005 to 2019. Clearinghouse, Data 
Breaches, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.privacyrights.org/data-
breaches (last visited Jan. 4, 2019). 
 29. Symantic Corporation, A Brief History of Data Breaches, LIFELOCK 
(2018), https://www.lifelock.com/education/history-of-data-breaches/ [hereinafter 
LIFELOCK]. See generally Clearinghouse, Data Breaches, PRIVACY RIGHTS 
CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.privacyrights.org/data-breaches?title=&taxonomy 
_vocabulary_11_tid%5B%5D=271 (last visited Jan. 4, 2019) (listing all of the 
significant data breaches in 2005 and the relevant information regarding each 
breach). 
 30. LIFELOCK, supra note 29. See also Clearinghouse, Data Breaches by 
Organization Type, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.privacyrights 
.org/data-breaches/organization?taxonomy_vocabulary_11_tid=2434 (last visited 
Jan. 4, 2019) (providing information on each organization affected by a data 
breach, including the education sector which represents a significant portion of 
organizations affected by a data breach each year). 
 31. Data Breaches by Organization Type, supra note 30.  See also Data 
Breaches, supra note 29. (providing the pertinent information regarding the 
Heartland Payment Systems data breach in 2009). 
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data breach where 110 million individuals’ payment and 
contact information were exposed.32 However, the Target 
breach was not even the largest breach of 2013. Yahoo! took 
the crown as the largest data breach in that year when it 
experienced a breach exposing over 3 billion user accounts.33 
Yahoo! initially discovered the breach in September 2016 
and disclosed that 500 million accounts were hacked in 2014. 
After further review, Yahoo! announced that an initial 
breach occurred in 2013 and affected 1 billion user accounts. 
Finally, in 2017 Yahoo! revised that estimate and 
acknowledged that the breach actually exposed all 3 billion 
user accounts within Yahoo!. Yahoo!’s security breach 
exposed the names, dates of birth, email addresses, 
passwords, security questions and answers of its users. To 
date, the Yahoo! data breach is the largest data breach in the 
United States.34 
Data breaches gained more fame when a breach affected 
high-profile Hollywood actors, actresses, and executives in 
2014. Sony Pictures Studio was breached in 2014 when large 
amounts of confidential documents were stolen by 
cybercriminals who called themselves “Guardians of the 
Peace.”35 These cybercriminals then posted massive amounts 
of internal Sony documents in the weeks following the 
breach, many of which included embarrassing information 
 
 32. LIFELOCK, supra note 29. Target initially confirmed that 40 million 
customers’ debit and credit card information was stolen. Then, weeks later, 
Target stated that 70 million people’s email and mailing addresses were stolen. 
 33. Jethro Mullen & Seth Fiegerman, Yahoo Tops the List of Largest Ever 
Data Breaches, CNN BUS. (Oct. 4, 2017, 5:20 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2017/ 
10/04/technology/yahoo-biggest-data-breaches-ever/index.html. 
 34. Soo Youn, Marriott’s Data Breach is Large, But It’s Not the Largest: These 
are the Five Worse Corporate Hacks, ABC NEWS (Nov. 30, 2018, 6:07 PM), 
https://abcnews.go.com/Technology/marriotts-data-breach-large-largest-worst-
corporate-hacks/story?id=59520391. 
 35. Andrea Peterson, The Sony Pictures Hack, Explained, WASH. POST (Dec. 
18, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/12/18/the-
sony-pictures-hack-explained/?utm_term=.6727c19f1378. 
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about Hollywood stars.36 Less than a month after the breach, 
the FBI concluded that the North Korean government was 
behind the security incident.37 Guardians of the Peace 
targeted Sony because of the potential release of its new 
movie The Interview, a comedy about a pair of American 
journalists sent to assassinate North Korean dictator Kim 
Jong Un.38 Although the Sony breach did not expose a large 
amount of consumer personal information, it did highlight 
the dangers that data breaches pose to our country.39 The 
Sony breach displayed how a foreign country can inflict 
significant harm on a U.S. business, the U.S. government, 
and its citizens by targeting a business with a data breach.40 
Following the highly-publicized Sony breach, data 
breaches continued to rise41 in the U.S., leading to the year 
 
 36. Id. See also JOSEPHINE WOLFF, YOU’LL SEE THIS MESSAGE WHEN IT IS TOO 
LATE, 166 (Sandra Braman ed., 2018) (“they [the Sony hackers] were looking to 
cause chaos—to publicly shame and torment SPE [Sony Pictures Entertainment] 
and its employees before as wide a global audience as possible by any means 
available, ranging from releasing high-level executives’ embarrassing email 
exchanges and salary data, to posting employee Social Security numbers and 
financial information, to disseminating as-yet-unreleased movies and scripts.”). 
 37. WOLFF, supra note 36, at 172. See also Jake Miller, FBI Sources: Sony 
Pictures Cyberattack Traced to North Korea, CBS NEWS  (Dec. 18, 2014 7:52 PM), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/fbi-north-korean-hackers-behind-sony-pictures-
cyberattack/. 
 38. Miller, supra note 37; see also Peterson, supra note 35 (“Sony Pictures 
canceled the theatrical release of the film Wednesday, responding to a vague 
threat against theaters showing the film supposedly posted by the hackers.”). 
 39. Julia Boorstin, The Sony Hack: One Year Later, CNBC (Nov. 25, 2015, 
10:26 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/11/24/the-sony-hack-one-year-later.html. 
(“The [Sony] hack revealed the personal information of tens of thousands of 
people, exposed embarrassing email exchanges between high-powered actors and 
executives”). 
 40. See WOLFF, supra note 36, at 172–81. 
 41. See Charles Riley, Insurance Giant Anthem Hit by Massive Data Breach, 
CNN BUS. (Feb. 6, 2015, 10:52 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2015/02/04/ 
technology/anthem-insurance-hack-data-security/ (discussing the health insurer 
Anthem, Inc.’s breach in 2015, which affected 78.8 million customers, exposing 
names, addresses, Social Security numbers, and even employment information of 
current and former customers.). See also U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 
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2017 where data breaches reached an all-time high of 1,579 
breaches in one year.42 The most notable data breaches in 
2017 were the Uber and Equifax data breaches, which 
dominated news headlines. The Equifax data breach affected 
over 140 million Americans and is discussed extensively in 
Part III of this Comment.43 Outside of the Equifax data 
breach, the second most prominent data breach disclosed in 
2017 was the Uber data breach. Although the security breach 
occurred in 2016, Uber executives concealed the breach from 
the public for over a year and finally publicly disclosed the 
breach in November 2017.44 On November 21, 2017, Uber’s 
CEO disclosed that 57 million users’ personal information 
had been breached, which included some 600,000 names and 
driver’s license numbers in the United States, as well as 
names, email addresses, and mobile phone numbers of 
riders.45 A strong reaction followed the Uber data breach 
because of the way the company completely mishandled the 
security breach. Uber customers were shocked and outraged 
that a company would pay hackers to cover up a breach and 
allow the public to go uninformed that their personal 
information was in the hands of cybercriminals for over a 
 
Cybersecurity Incidents, OPM.GOV, https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cyber 
security-incidents/ (discussing the United States Personnel Management 2015 
breach exposing personal information of 21.5 million current, former, and 
prospective federal employees). 
 42. CyberScout, 2017 Annual Data Breach Year-End Review, IDENTITY THEFT 
RESOURCE CTR., 3 (2017), https://www.idtheftcenter.org/images/breach/2017 
Breaches/2017AnnualDataBreachYearEndReview.pdf. 
 43. See infra Part III. 
 44. See Andy Greenberg, Hack Brief: Uber Paid Off Hacker’s to Hide a 57-
Million User Data Breach, WIRED (Nov. 21, 2017, 7:56 PM), https://www.wired 
.com/story/uber-paid-off-hackers-to-hide-a-57-million-user-data-breach/ (stating 
that “Uber paid a $100,000 ransom to its hackers to keep the breach quiet and 
delete the data they’d stolen. It then failed to disclose the attack to the public—
potentially violating breach disclosure laws in many of the states where its users 
reside—and also kept the data theft secret from the FTC.”). 
 45. Dara Khosrowshahi, 2016 Data Security Incident, UBER NEWSROOM (Nov. 
21, 2017), https://www.uber.com/newsroom/2016-data-incident/. 
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year.46 Although Uber acted in a completely unprofessional 
and unethical manner, the company’s reaction to the breach 
underscores how important data security is to a company, as 
well as the strong incentive a company has to prevent a 
breach from occurring in the first place.47 However, by failing 
to disclose the breach in hopes of dodging negative publicity, 
Uber violated multiple data breach notification laws. This 
led to Uber ultimately agreeing to pay $148 million in a joint 
settlement it reached with the top law enforcement officers 
in all fifty U.S. states.48 
This past year has been a banner year for data breaches 
in the United States. Multiple retailers disclosed data 
breaches in 2018, most notably Macy’s, Adidas, Best Buy, 
and Saks Fifth Avenue.49 However, none of these retail 
breaches compare to the highly publicized breaches that 
occurred at Facebook, Marriott, and Under Armour in 2018. 
On March 29, 2018, Under Armour stated in a press release 
that a security issue occurred with MyFitnessPal, the 
company’s food and nutrition application and website, in 
February 2018.50 After an investigation, Under Armour 
 
 46. See Tom Ball, Uber Data Breach Scandal: A Shocked Tech Industry Reacts 
to the Cover Up, COMPUT. BUS. REV. (Nov. 22, 2017), https://www.cbronline.com/ 
cybersecurity/breaches/uber-data-breach-scandal-cover-up-reaction/. 
 47. See PONEMON INST., 2018 COST OF A DATA BREACH STUDY 29 (2018) 
[hereinafter 2018 PONEMON INST. STUDY] (stating that “the cost of lost business 
was particularly high for US organizations ($4.20 million). This cost component 
includes the abnormal turnover of customers, increased customer acquisition 
activities, reputation losses, and diminished goodwill.”). Therefore, Uber had a 
strong financial incentive to hide its data breach because of the damage a data 
breach does to a company’s reputation. See also infra Section II.A.2. 
 48. Ben Kockman, Uber, States Strike $148M Deal to End Data Breach 
Dispute, LAW360: CYBERSECURITY & PRIVACY (Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.law 
360.com/cybersecurity-privacy/articles/1086585/uber-states-strike-148m-deal-to-
end-data-breach-dispute. 
 49. Dennis Green & Mary Hanbury, If You Shopped at These 16 Stores Last 
Year, Your Data Might Have Been Stolen, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 22, 2018, 5:39 PM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/data-breaches-2018-4. 
 50. Under Armour, Inc., Under Armour, Under Armour Notifies MyFitnessPal 
Users of Data Security Issue, UNDER ARMOUR (Mar. 29, 2018, 4:30 PM), 
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found that 150 million user accounts were affected by the 
security breach.51 The breach exposed users’ usernames, 
email addresses, and passwords, but no payment 
information was breached.52 
Then, on September 28, 2018, Facebook announced a 
data breach that exposed fifty million user accounts.53 This 
breach gave hackers the ability to take over accounts, 
impersonating users and accessing private information 
about these people and their friends.54 Although Facebook 
executives stated that there was no evidence that users’ 
password or credit card information was exposed, this breach 
still gave hackers information that could be used for identity 
theft.55 The most significant aspect of the Facebook data 
breach is the possibility for Facebook to be liable under the 
new European Law, the General Data Protection 
Regulation.56 The Irish Data Protection Commission 
launched an investigation into Facebook shortly after the 
company announced the breach and the investigation “will 
examine Facebook’s compliance with its obligation under the 




 51. Id. 
 52. Lisa Marie Segarra, Under Armour Breach Exposes 150 Million 
MyFitnessPal Accounts, TIME: SECURITY (Mar. 30, 2018), http://time.com/ 
5222015/under-armour-myfitnesspal-data-breach/. 
 53. Allison Grande, Facebook Breach Leaves 50M User Accounts Exposed, 
LAW360 (Sept. 28, 2018, 9:48 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1087537 
?utm_source=ios-shared&utm_medium=ios&utm_campaign=ios-shared. 
 54. Deepa Seetharaman & Robert McMillan, Facebook Finds Security Flaw 
Affecting Almost 50 Million Accounts, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 28, 2018, 7:17 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-flaw-allowed-hackers-to-take-over-user-
accounts-1538153947. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Sam Schechner, Facebook Faces Potential $1.63 Billion Fine in Europe 
Over Data Breach, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 30, 2018, 2:08 PM), https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/facebook-faces-potential-1-63-billion-fine-in-europe-over-data-breach-
1538330906. 
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appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure 
the security and safeguarding of the personal data it 
processes.”57 The investigation into Facebook’s compliance 
with the GDPR is extremely significant because it is the first 
high-profile GDPR investigation and Facebook could 
ultimately face a $1.63 billion fine if found to be 
noncompliant with the law.58 
Finally, 2018 ended with a massive data breach 
disclosure when Marriott announced on November 30, 2018, 
that hackers breached its Starwood reservation system and 
stole the personal data of 500 million guests.59 The Marriott 
breach started back in 2014 and affected customers who 
made reservations for Marriott-owned hotel rooms from 2014 
to 2018.60 After further review, Marriott announced on 
January 4, 2019, that 383 million guests were affected by the 
breach, not the 500 million originally reported.61 Marriott 
also revealed that the data breach exposed guests’ passport 
numbers, email addresses, and payment card data.62 The 
 
 57. Caroline Spezio, GDPR Gets Early Test with Ireland’s New Probe into 
Facebook’s Big Breach, CORP. COUNSEL (Oct. 3, 2018, 7:07 PM), https://www.law 
.com/corpcounsel/2018/10/03/gdpr-gets-early-test-with-irelands-new-probe-into-
facebooks-big-breach/. 
 58. Schechner, supra note 56. (“Under GDPR, companies that don’t do enough 
to safeguard their users’ data risk a maximum fine of €20 million ($23 million), 
or 4% of a firm’s global annual revenue for the prior year, whichever is higher. 
Facebook’s maximum fine would be $1.63 billion using the larger calculation.”). 
 59. Aisha Al-Muslim et al., Marriott Says Starwood Data Breach Affects Up 
To 500 Million People, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 30, 2018, 8:02 PM), https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/marriott-says-up-to-500-million-affected-by-starwood-breach-
1543587121. 
 60. Nicole Perlroth et al., Marriott Hacking Exposes Data of Up to 500 Million 
Guests, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/30/ 
business/marriott-data-breach.html. 
 61. Connie Kim, Marriott Provides Update on Starwood Database Security 
Incident, MARRIOTT INT’L: NEWS CTR. (Jan. 4, 2019), http://news.marriott.com/ 
2019/01/marriott-provides-update-on-starwood-database-security-incident/. 
 62. Kirsten Grind & Dustin Volz, Marriott Says Hackers Swiped Millions of 
Passport Numbers, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 4, 2019, 6:34 PM), https://www.wsj.com/art 
icles/marriott-says-hackers-swiped-millions-of-passport-numbers-11546605000. 
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compromise of passport information is especially dangerous 
as it would be extremely valuable to foreign spies. 
Accordingly, the Federal Bureau of Investigation is leading 
an investigation into the Marriott hack to determine who 
was behind the hack.63 Similar to Facebook, Marriott may 
also potentially be liable under the GDPR if it is found that 
Marriott was noncompliant.64 In all, many high-profile data 
breaches occurred in 2018 and further emphasized the need 
for changes in the law to protect consumers and prevent data 
breaches in the future. 
II. NEGATIVE EFFECTS ON THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 
The increased frequency of data breaches in recent years 
has created large negative effects on the American economy 
and society in general. Data breaches cause problems for 
three distinct groups in America. Data breaches negatively 
affect (1) the organization that is breached, (2) the consumers 
that have had their personal information stolen, and (3) the 
economy as a whole.65 This Part will discuss, exclusively, 
how security breaches negatively affect each of these three 
groups. 
A. The Effect on the Breached Organization 
First, data breaches are enormously costly for the 
organization that is breached. An organization that has 
experienced a data breach suffers a loss in two ways: (1) 
incurring increased expenses and (2) losing future revenues 
and profits through customer loss and damage to an 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. See Joyce Hanson, Hospitality Cases and Trends to Watch in 2019, 
LAW360 (Jan. 1, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1110261/hospitality-
cases-and-trends-to-watch-in-2019; see also Dan Clark, Experts: Marriott’s In-
House Team Has Much Work Ahead, CORP. COUNSEL (Dec. 3, 2018, 6:46 PM), 
https://www.law.com/corpcounsel/2018/12/03/experts-marriotts-in-house-team-
has-much-work-ahead/. 
 65. See infra Sections II.A, B, C. 
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organization’s reputation.66 
1. Increased Expenses 
A company subjected to a data breach will initially suffer 
loss from increased expenses due to increased legal fees and 
notification costs.67 A study of the cost of data breaches is 
conducted each year by The Ponemon Institute.68 These 
studies show that the United States consistently leads the 
world, by a significant margin, in data breach costs.69 The 
Ponemon Institute’s 2018 Cost of a Data Breach Study: 
Global Overview found that the average cost of a data breach 
in the United States is $7.91 million, which is almost double 
the average global cost.70 A large portion of these costs 
associated with data breaches are a result of increased legal 
fees and notification costs.71 American companies that are 
breached spend $1.76 million of the $7.51 million total cost 
of a data breach on post data breach response activities.72 
These post data breach response activities include “help desk 
activities, inbound communications, special investigative 
activities, remediation, legal expenditures, product 
discounts, identity protection services and regulatory 
 
 66. See DAVID BENDER, COMPUTER LAW: A GUIDE TO CYBERLAW AND DATA 
PRIVACY LAW, § 42.10 (Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 2019). 
 67. See id. 
 68. PONEMON INST., Why We Are Unique (2018), https://www.ponemon.org/ 
about-ponemon. The Ponemon Institute is a research center dedicated to privacy, 
data protection, and information security policy that releases a yearly review of 
the cost of data breaches. 
 69. See 2018 PONEMON INST. STUDY, supra note 47, at 9. 
 70. Id. at 15. The global average cost of a data breach $3.86 million. The 
Middle East is the second costliest at an average cost of $5.31 million. 
 71. Id. at 6; See also BUS. INSIDER, Data breaches cost US businesses an 
average of $7 million—here’s the breakdown (Apr. 27, 2017 11:00 AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/sc/data-breaches-cost-us-businesses-7-million-
2017-4 [hereinafter BUS. INSIDER] (Establishing legal costs as one of the ten 
biggest expenses of a data breach.). 
 72. See 2018 PONEMON INST. STUDY, supra note 47, at 9. 
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interventions.”73 Included as part of the post data breach 
response activities are notification activities which, once 
again, the United States leads the world in this data breach 
cost category.74 The average American business spends 
$740,000 on notification costs per breach, which is $440,000 
more than the second leading region for notification costs, 
the Middle East.75 The United States’ fragmented regulatory 
approach is the leading contributor to these notification 
costs76 because the many different notification laws make 
compliance incredibly costly and burdensome for American 
businesses.77 
Currently, there are fifty separate state data breach 
notification laws in the United States, all with different 
requirements for notification and differing levels of severity 
for noncompliance.78 As one would imagine, the variation 
among state data breach notification laws makes compliance 
after a breach extremely complex and difficult.79 When an 
 
 73. Id. at 28. 
 74. See id. at 9, 27. Although the Ponemon Institute considers post-breach 
data response and notification costs as two separate cost centers, both are part of 
the costs that occur post-breach and require compliance with the multitude of 
U.S. notification laws. 
 75. See id. at 5, 27. The Ponemon Institute studied the Middle East region as 
a whole, which for this study included the United Arab Emirates and Saudi 
Arabia. 
 76. Id. at 6. The Ponemon Institute provides examples of notification costs 
including: “Emails, letters, outbound telephone calls, or general notice that 
personal information was lost or stolen. Communication with regulators; 
determination of all regulatory requirements, engagement of outside experts [(i.e. 
attorneys)].” 
 77. See Herb Wisebaum, The Total Cost of a Data Breach—Including Lost 
Business—Keeps Growing, NBC NEWS (July 30, 2018, 3:15 PM), https://www.nbc 
news.com/business/consumer/total-cost-data-breach-including-lost-business-
keeps-growing-n895826. 
 78. Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-
information-technology/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx [hereinafter 
NCSL] (providing a list of all fifty state data breach notification laws). 
 79. See BENDER, supra note 66, at § 42.04. 
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entity discovers that there has been a breach in its system 
one of the first action steps, among other things,80 is to call a 
lawyer or team of lawyers to address the complexities of data 
breach notification laws.81 These lawyers have the crucial 
task of identifying which state laws have been triggered by 
the breach and the requirements under each law.82 
Once an organization experiences a data breach, it will 
have to navigate the many differing compliance 
requirements under the fifty different notification statutes. 
First, an organization will need to determine if it is required 
to notify state agencies in addition to notifying affected 
individuals. Some state laws have no state agency 
notification requirement at all.83 Other state laws require 
notification to state agencies only if a certain number of 
residents of the state are affected by the breach, whereas 
other states require notification to state agencies regardless 
of the number of affected residents.84 After determining 
whom to notify, an organization will need to determine if 
there is a specific time requirement within which it has to 
notify affected individuals. Some states require notification 
within a specific time frame, while others simply require 
 
 80. Id. (“Forensic experts may be needed to determine exactly which personal 
data was affected by the breach, public relations experts may be needed to draft 
and send letters to affected individuals, and management will need to meet and 
make decisions whether to go beyond what the law requires.”). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See DIGITAL GUARDIAN, The Definitive Guide to U.S. State Data Breach 
Laws (2018) [hereinafter Definitive Guide to U.S. State Data Breach Laws]. 
 84. See id. See also Maya Atrakchi et. al., State Data Breach Notification 
Laws: Overview of the Patchwork, JD SUPRA (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.jdsupra 
.com/legalnews/state-data-breach-notification-laws-73889/; Jeffrey Kosseff, My 
Company Has Had a Breach: Whom Do I Have to Notify?, IAPP: THE PRIVACY 
ADVISOR (Mar. 21, 2016), https://iapp.org/news/a/my-company-has-had-a-breach-
who-do-i-have-to-notify/. (“About 20 states require companies to notify state 
regulators if they have informed customers of a data breach, though some of these 
states only require regulator notice if a minimum number of individuals have 
been notified (typically 500 or 1,000).”). 
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notification “without unreasonable delay.”85 The state 
statutes that do require a specific time frame all have 
varying time frames within which an organization must 
notify affected consumers.86 
Then, after determining the various notification 
requirements and time frames, a corporation will need to 
determine what form the notices to individuals must take to 
ensure compliance with each statute. Some statutes require 
a direct notification to consumers with written mail or email, 
whereas other statutes simply allow posting a notice in a 
general circulation newspaper to satisfy notice.87 Finally, 
after determining the form in which an individual must be 
notified, breached organizations must determine what 
information must be included in the notification to affected 
individuals. Some states require specific information to be 
included in the notice such as the date(s) of the breach, a 
description of the information accessed by hackers, a 
telephone number to call for further information, and a host 
of other information.88 On the other hand, some state 
 
 85. See Definitive Guide to U.S. State Data Breach Laws, supra note 83. See, 
e.g., IND. CODE § 4-1-11; ALASKA STAT. § 45.48.010 (2018); IOWA CODE ANN. 
§ 715C.2 (West 2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-7a02 (West 2019); MASS. GEN. LAWS 
§ 93H-3; MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-6-1503 (West 2019) (All of these state statutes 
simply require an organization that has been breached to notify consumers 
“without unreasonable delay” and provide little guidance as to what constitutes 
an unreasonable delay.). 
 86. See, e.g., 2018 S.B. 318, Act. No. 396 (requiring notification within 45 days 
in Alabama); FLA STAT. ANN. § 501.171 (West 2019) (requiring notification within 
30 days in Florida); S.D. COD. LAWS § 20-40-20 (requiring notification within 60 
days in South Dakota). 
 87. See, e.g., UTAH CODE § 13-44-101 (allowing notification by first-class mail, 
electronically, over the phone, or publication in a newspaper); S.B. 318, Act. No. 
396 (requiring notification either by mail or email); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82 
(West 2019) (requiring notice to be either in written form or electronic format 
consistent with E-SIGN). 
 88. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 487N-2 (West 2019) (requiring the notice 
to contain clear and concise information regarding the type of covered 
information that was accessed or acquired, a general description of the incident, 
what actions a consumer should take to prevent their covered information from 
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statutes do not require any specific information to be 
included in the notification and let the breached organization 
decide what information it will provide.89 In sum, fifty 
separate state notification breach statutes create an 
enormous compliance burden for a breached organization. 
Consequently, these compliance burdens have caused a 
significant increase in cost to a breached organization, which 
ultimately leads to the United States leading the world in 
data breach costs. 
2. Lost Future Revenue and Profit 
A data breach will have a substantial effect on customer 
loyalty, which causes organizations to lose future revenues 
and profits following a data breach. A 2017 study found that 
70% of consumers would stop doing business with a company 
if it experienced a data breach.90 In the United States 
specifically, consumers are much more likely to leave a 
company that has experienced a breach because they have 
more alternatives to turn to after a breach, thereby making 
their loyalty harder to preserve.91 With more notification 
statutes passed into law in recent years and data breaches 
dominating the news headlines, American consumers are 
now more aware of data breaches and have higher 
 
further access or misuse, and a telephone number that consumers can call for 
further information and assistance); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.171 (West 2019) 
(requiring notice to include at least: date(s) of the breach; a description of the 
covered information accessed or believed to be accessed; and contact information 
for the covered entity). 
 89. See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 45.48.010 (West 2018); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-110-
105 (West 2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 12B-101 (West 2018) et. seq.; 2018 S.B. 
318, Act. No. 396 (All of these state notification statutes do not provide a 
requirement for specific information that must be included in the notification to 
consumers; it is left up to the breached organization to decide what information 
to include in the notification.). 
 90. See GEMALTO, Data Breaches and Customer Loyalty 2017. Gemalto is an 
international digital security company that conducted a study on the effects of a 
data breach on consumer loyalty in 2017. 
 91. 2018 PONEMON INST. STUDY, supra note 47, at 29. 
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expectations regarding how companies should help them 
following a breach.92 
The increased consumer awareness has resulted in the 
United States leading the world in lost business following a 
security breach. Accordingly, a data breach costs American 
organizations an average of $4.2 million in lost business.93 
This cost component includes increased turnover of 
customers, greater customer acquisition activities, 
reputation losses, and diminished goodwill.94 
The enormous cost of lost business has the negative 
consequence of incentivizing companies to hide a security 
breach from the public. The Uber and Equifax breaches are 
prime examples. When Equifax was breached in 2017, the 
company waited two months to disclose the breach.95 Worse 
than Equifax, Uber hid its 2016 data breach for over a year 
by paying hackers to hide the data breach.96 It is now clear 
why Uber paid the hackers to keep the security breach quiet. 
Uber feared losing millions of dollars from lost business after 
disclosing the data breach. With 70% of consumers likely to 
stop doing business with Uber after finding out about a data 
breach and Lyft being a suitable alternative ride-hailing app, 
Uber was likely to lose millions of customers after disclosing 
its data breach.97 Therefore, the current security breach 
environment in America incentivizes organizations to hide 
their data breaches because of the high costs and lost 
customers that will result following the disclosure of the 
breach. 
 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. The Middle East has the second largest customer loss costs with an 
average of $2.18 million. Therefore, the cost of lost business in the U.S. is double 
that of any country in the world. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See infra notes 141–46 and accompanying text. 
 96. See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text. 
 97. See GEMALTO, supra note 87, at 1. 
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B. The Effect on Consumers That Had Their Personal 
Information Breached 
The individual affected most by a data breach is the 
individual whose personal information was stolen and now is 
in the hands of cybercriminals. The most obvious reason is 
that consumers whose information is stolen are at significant 
risk of having their information used to make fraudulent 
charges to their accounts. Outside of this obvious negative 
consequence to consumers, there are two significant negative 
effects of a data breach on the individual whose personal 
information was stolen. First, the person who has been a 
victim of a breach may not even be aware that her personal 
information was stolen.98 Second, even if an individual is 
aware that her personal information has been stolen, there 
is little she can do to obtain recourse.99 
The United States’ patchwork approach to data breach 
notification laws is a fundamental reason why many 
Americans are left unaware that their personal information 
has been stolen after a security breach. Although some 
Americans simply have not put forth the effort to check to 
see if their data has been breached,100 the current 
notification landscape in the United States does not make it 
easy to determine whether one has been affected by a breach. 
The lack of a uniform notification statute in the United 
States makes the likelihood of one learning of the theft 
 
 98. See Blanco, supra note 12; see also Paul Roberts, For U.S. Consumers: 
Ignorance of a Data Breach is Bliss, DIGITAL GUARDIAN (Dec. 21, 2017), 
https://digitalguardian.com/blog/us-consumers-ignorance-data-breaches-bliss 
(stating that although “U.S. consumers are deeply concerned about the privacy 
and security of the data they share online, [they] often assume that massive data 
leaks and thefts have miraculously spared their personal information from 
exposure.”). 
 99. See infra Section IV.A.3, for a discussion of the current circuit split in data 
breach class action suits. This circuit split means that consumers who have had 
their data breached do not know if they will be compensated for their lost time 
and money. 
 100. See Pesce, supra note 12. 
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dependent on where one lives.101 All fifty separate data 
breach notification statutes in the U.S. differ significantly in 
what they require organizations to disclose to consumers, as 
well as the manner in which to notify consumers that have 
been breached. In 2017, only about twenty states had specific 
provisions about how consumers must be notified and what 
information must be contained in the message.102 There are 
also varying levels of stringency within these twenty state 
data breach notification provisions.103 For example, in Utah, 
simply posting in a general circulation newspaper is 
sufficient.104 Conversely, in California, there are stricter 
data breach notification laws that require an entity to use a 
broader media notification and send an email message to all 
people who may be affected.105 
Consequently, due to the ambiguity and variation among 
state data breach notification laws, many Americans are left 
unaware that their personal information is in the hands of 
cybercriminals.106 A consumer that lives in a state with a 
weak notification law, such as Utah, may not be personally 
notified at all because the notification statute does not 
require personal notification.107 Additionally, because of the 
enormous variation among the notification laws, it is easy for 
an organization to fail to comply with the requisite 
 
 101. Roberts, supra note 95. 
 102. Blanco, supra note 12. 
 103. Id. 
 104. UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-44-202(5)(iv)(A) (West 2009); see also Blanco, supra 
note 12. 
 105. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29 (West 2017); Blanco, supra note 12. California 
law also requires that the notification must be written “in plain language” and 
provides the specific headings to incorporate in the notification. 
 106. See Blanco, supra note 12. 
 107. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-44-202(5)(iv)(A). See, e.g., Blanco, supra note 12 
(explaining that inconsistent state laws result in not all consumers having 
adequate protection in the event of a data breach and, in the case of Equifax, 
millions of consumers still had not been notified that they were affected by the 
breach three months after it occurred). 
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notification statute, thereby leaving consumers unaware 
that their personal information has been breached.108 
Even if consumers are aware that their personal 
information has been breached, current U.S. law does not 
provide consumers with an avenue for the requisite recourse. 
When an individual discovers they have been a victim of a 
data breach, they must act immediately to protect their 
assets. These actions include: creating a fraud alert and 
monitoring accounts, obtaining copies of credit reports, as 
well as potentially placing a credit freeze on credit files and 
purchasing credit monitoring.109 
These breached individuals spend valuable time and 
money protecting themselves from further harm.110 
Subsequently, these individuals should be able to recoup the 
lost time and money they were required to spend protecting 
their personal information and assets after the security 
breach. However, the current circuit split in the law does not 
always allow the affected consumers to sue as a class.111 
Presently, circuits are split over whether plaintiffs meet the 
standing requirements under Article III of the U.S. 
Constitution in data breach class action cases.112 The Second, 
 
 108. See supra notes 78–86 and accompanying text. 
 109. See Susan Henson, Here’s What You Should Do After a Data Breach, 
EXPERIAN (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/heres-
what-you-should-do-after-a-data-breach/; see also Seena Gressin, The Equifax 
Data Breach: What to Do, F.T.C. (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/ 
blog/2017/09/equifax-data-breach-what-do. 
 110. Experian credit monitoring costs $4.99 for the first month and then $24.99 
for the months following. Credit Monitoring, EXPERIAN, https://www.experian 
.com/consumer-products/credit-monitoring.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2019) 
[hereinafter EXPERIAN CREDIT MONITORING]. See N. Gregory Mankiw, PRINCIPLES 
OF ECONOMICS, 5–6 (Jane Tufts et al. eds., 2018) (“The opportunity cost of an item 
is what you give up to get that item.”). 
 111. See infra Part IV; see also Luke Martin, Resolving the Circuit Split on 
Article III Standing for Data Breach Suits, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. (Feb. 17, 2019 
10:00 PM), https://cblr.columbia.edu/resolving-the-circuit-split-on-article-iii-
standing-for-data-breach-suits/. 
 112. See Bradford, supra note 8, at 1327; see also infra Part IV. 
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Third, and Eighth Circuits have all recently held that 
plaintiffs in a data breach class action case lacked the 
appropriate standing under Article III of the Constitution. 
Conversely, the D.C., Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits 
have held that plaintiffs do meet the standing requirements 
under Article III.113 This current split in the law makes it 
difficult for consumers to file a class action lawsuit and 
survive a motion to dismiss based on lack of standing. 
Therefore, those consumers that have had their personal 
information stolen in a data breach are left not knowing 
whether they will have any remedy for the harm they just 
suffered. 
C. The Effect on the Economy as a Whole 
Ultimately, these negative effects take a toll on the 
entire economy, and all American consumers are left 
suffering from the consequences of the many security 
breaches that occur every year. Although American 
organizations suffer a large increase in costs after a data 
breach, the majority of these costs are not ultimately paid for 
by the entity that was breached. Rather, these costs are 
passed on to the consumer.114 
 
 113. Jason C. Gavejian et al., Fourth Circuit Weighs in on Standing in Data 
Breach Litigation, NAT’L L. REV. (July 2, 2018), https://www.natlawreview.com/ 
article/fourth-circuit-weighs-standing-data-breach-litigation (“Circuit courts 
have been split on the issue of standing in the data breach context, with some 
courts finding standing where only a heightened ‘risk of future harm’ 
exists, i.e. the likelihood that stolen data may be misused (Sixth, Seventh, 
and Ninth Circuits), while other circuit courts require actual harm such as 
financial loss (Second, Third, and Eighth Circuits).”). 
 114. See Mankiw, supra note 110, at 499 (explaining the consumer price index 
(“CPI”) and the produce price index (“PPI”), the author states “[b]ecause firms 
eventually pass on their costs to consumers in the form of higher consumer prices, 
changes in the PPI are often thought to be useful in predicting changes in the 
CPI.”). See generally, MILTON FRIEDMAN, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS A FREE 
LUNCH 95–96 (1975). In the context of corporate taxes, Milton Friedman explains 
that a corporation is “a pure intermediary through which its employees, 
shareholders, and stockholders cooperate for their mutual benefit.” That is, the 
money sent to the IRS for taxes comes from the company’s employees, customers, 
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As an example, the 2013 Target data breach resulted in 
financial institutions absorbing many of the costs and then 
passing these costs onto consumers.115 Banks, credit unions, 
and credit card companies will then pass these costs onto 
consumers in the form of higher average interest rates and 
service fees to their customers.116 Financial institutions are 
not alone, as all organizations will pass on the cost of a data 
breach to consumers. Retailers pass their increased expenses 
from a data breach onto their customers in the form of higher 
overall prices for goods and services.117 Even if a company 
has insurance that covers the data breach, the consumer still 
pays these costs when the insurer ultimately increases its 
premium to the breached company and that company 
inevitably passes this increased cost onto its customers.118 
An additional cost to the entire economy is the indirect 
cost of increased taxes paid to law enforcement. In 2017, the 
 
and stockholders. This economic principle is called “there is no such thing as a 
free lunch,” meaning that even if something is offered as “free” there is always a 
hidden indirect cost. The term originated from American saloons offering free 
lunches to patrons but requiring them to purchase drinks in order to get them. 
Therefore, the “free lunch” was paid for by the customer in the price of the drink. 
See TYLER COWEN, AN ECONOMIST GETS LUNCH, 63–67 (2012). Applying these 
economic principles to data breaches, we see that, ultimately, the consumer will 
bear the burden of paying the enormous costs of security breaches. When a 
company suffers a breach, it incurs increased costs associated with the breach. 
However, the company does not bear the burden of these costs; they are 
eventually passed on to the consumer through increased prices and fees. 
 115. See Ryan Tracy, In a Cyber Breach, Who Pays, Banks or Retailers?, WALL 
ST. J. (Jan. 12, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-a-cyber-breach-who-pays-
banks-or-retailers-1389572452 (stating that post-breach banks and credit unions 
carry the burden of closing accounts and reissuing new credit and debit cards). 
 116. Michael D. Simpson, Comment, All Your Data Are Belong to Us: Consumer 
Data Breach Rights and Remedies in an Electronic Exchange Economy, 87 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 669, 683 (2016). 
 117. BUS. VIBES, Data Breaches: How the Costs Gets Passed to Consumers (Aug. 
23, 2014), https://www.business2community.com/tech-gadgets/data-breaches-
costs-gets-passed-consumers-0977859 [hereinafter BUSINESS VIBES]. 
 118. Id. See Mankiw, supra note 110, at 499. See also Neil Amato, The Hidden 
Costs of a Data Breach, J. OF ACCOUNTANCY (July 25, 2016), https://www.journal 
ofaccountancy.com/news/2016/jul/hidden-costs-of-data-breach-201614870.html. 
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FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center received over 
300,000 victim complaints.119 American citizens pay for this 
law enforcement through taxes. Consequently, more security 
breaches will, in turn, mean more tax dollars put into law 
enforcement’s efforts to combat fraud and cybercriminals.120 
This ultimately results in increased strain on taxpayers and 
the entire U.S. economy due to the increasingly large number 
of security breaches. 
Data breaches also have a negative effect on the job 
market.121 A 2013 study by the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies postulated that cybercrime cost the 
U.S. economy 500,000 jobs lost in 2013.122 Although this is 
not the net loss as many workers will find other jobs, 
cybercrime and data breaches may cause underemployment 
if displaced workers do not find jobs that pay as well.123 
Indeed, as the number of data breaches has increased 
significantly since 2013, the cost to the economy has also 
risen.124 The Center for Strategic and International Studies 
 
 119. Sam Wood, FBI Reports Cybercrime Cost the U.S. $1.4B in 2017, but the 
Actual Number is Probably Even Bigger, GOV’T TECH. (May 10, 2018), 
http://www.govtech.com/security/FBI-Reports-Cybercrime-Cost-the-US-14B-in-
2017-but-the-Actual-Number-is-Probably-Even-Bigger.html (stating that the 
“second most reported offense was personal data breaches, which are used for 
identity theft or industrial espionage.”). 
 120. See BUS. VIBES, supra note 117 (“indirect losses come in the form of higher 
taxes paid for increased law enforcement vigilance of fraud and regulatory 
compliance across the board.”). 
 121. Id. (It is “estimated that the economy as a whole suffers a net loss of some 
500,000 jobs per year due to fraud related expenses to companies.”). See also 
Eamon Javers, Cybercrime May Cost U.S. Economy $100 Billion, Says New 
Study, CNBC (July 22, 2013), https://www.cnbc.com/id/100904224 (“cybercrime 
creates a $100 billion annual loss to the U.S. economy.”). 
 122. CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, The Economic 
Impact of Cybercrime and Cyber Espionage (2013) https://csis-prod.s3.amazon 
aws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/60396rpt_cybercrime-cost_071 
3_ph4_0.pdf. 
 123. Id. 
 124. CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, The Economic 
Impact of Cybercrime—No Slowing Down (2018) https://www.mcafee.com/enter 
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2018 follow-up study found that cybercrime may cost the 
global economy $600 billion, or 0.8% of the global GDP.125 
The internet economy, the fastest growing segment of the 
global economy, was worth $4.2 trillion of the global economy 
in 2016.126 Comparing the global internet economy to 
cybercrime, we can see that cybercrime is essentially a 14% 
tax on growth.127 Taking all of these factors into account, it 
is clear that in the end, the entire American economy and its 
consumers bear most of the burden of paying the cost of 
security breaches. 
In summary, data breaches have negative consequences 
on the organization that was breached, the individuals 
whose personal information was stolen, and the economy as 
a whole. There are multiple ways the American legal system 
could improve to help alleviate these negative 
consequences.128 The infamous 2017 Equifax data breach 
incorporated all three of these negative consequences. 
Therefore, the Equifax data breach provides a great 
opportunity for the American legal system to help relieve the 
negative consequences of data breaches. 
III. THE EQUIFAX DATA BREACH 
On September 7, 2017, Equifax announced that criminal 
hackers attacked and infiltrated its servers.129 This data 
breach affected approximately 143 million U.S. consumers, 
which accounts for nearly 44% of the U.S. population.130 The 
 
prise/en-us/assets/executive-summaries/es-economic-impact-cybercrime.pdf. 
 125. Id. at 4 (providing reasons for the increase in cybercrime’s cost to the 
global economy). 
 126. Id. at 19. 
 127. Id. (“There would be real benefit to development and prosperity in all 
countries if the international community made a concerted effort to reduce 
[cybercrime].”). 
 128. See infra Part V. 
 129. EQUIFAX, supra note 2. 
 130. See id. 
2019] EQUIFAX DATA BREACH 1161 
information accessed included “names, Social Security 
numbers, birth dates, addresses, and, in some instances, 
driver’s license numbers.”131 In February of 2018, nearly five 
months after Equifax disclosed the breach, the Wall Street 
Journal reported that the breach was even worse than first 
imagined and the stolen data also included tax identification 
numbers, as well as driver’s license states and issuance 
dates.132 Needless to say, Equifax’s data breach left millions 
of Americans vulnerable to identity theft. 
The Equifax data breach is unlike any of the previous 
data breaches that American citizens have experienced.133 
Typically, data breaches involve a hacker stealing 
usernames and passwords for a specific account.134 A hacker 
can use that information to access the user’s account and set 
up more fake accounts under the user’s name.135 Hackers can 
also try to take advantage of the fact that many people use 
the same username and password by trying to use the same 
information to access accounts at other institutions. 
However, the Equifax data breach has the potential to be 
more damaging to consumers. This is because the 
information from the Equifax breach can bring context to the 
massive amount of data that has been stolen in recent 
years.136 A cybercriminal can determine if a person has a 
legitimate account with a financial institution from the 
information received in the Equifax breach and combine that 
 
 131. Id. 
 132. AnnaMaria Andriotis, Equifax May Be Worse Than You Think, WALL ST. 
J. (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/equifax-hack-might-be-worse-
than-you-think-1518191370. 
 133. Ricardo Villadiego, The Equifax Data: Now That They Have It, How Will 
Hackers Use It?, FORBES (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbes 
techcouncil/2017/11/29/the-equifax-data-now-that-they-have-it-how-will-hackers 
-use-it/#2e6b56cb602c. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
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information with the username and password information 
from previous data breaches. This will allow cybercriminals 
to maximize account takeover and conversion to fraud for 
known accounts that contain significant amounts of 
money.137 Outside of this unique attack, cybercriminals can 
also revert to the more traditional path of identity theft by 
opening fraudulent accounts using the victim’s personal 
information.138 Equifax’s “breach exposed more than enough 
information about each [consumer] to apply for loans, credit 
cards, and checking accounts.”139 “Cybercriminals can use 
these funds outright, or they can physically move money 
from one account to another to ‘cash out’” and obtain the 
actual funds these accounts are worth.140 
To make matters worse, Equifax waited over a month to 
notify consumers about the data breach.141 Equifax 
discovered the data breach on July 29, 2017.142 However, the 
company did not publicly disclose the data breach until 
September 7, 2017.143 This failure to notify consumers put 
these consumers in danger because their personal 
information could have been used to open fraudulent 
accounts, credit cards, apply for loans, and other actions that  
negatively affect consumers’ finances. By failing to disclose 
the data breach for over a month, consumers were not able 
to take the appropriate preventative measures to protect 
their financial information such as credit monitoring and 
 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Michael Hiltzik, Here are all the ways the Equifax data breach is worse 
than you can imagine, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/ 
business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-equifax-breach-20170908-story.html. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Elizabeth Weise, A timeline of events surrounding the Equifax data 
breach, USA TODAY (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/ 
2017/09/26/timeline-events-surrounding-equifax-data-breach/703691001/. 
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setting up a credit freeze with all three credit bureaus.144 
Even after Equifax’s public announcement of the data 
breach, millions of consumers are still unaware of the data 
breach.145 As of November 2017, 71 million U.S. adults have 
not heard anything about the Equifax data breach.146 As a 
result, millions of Americans are left in the dark, completely 
unaware that their personal information has been stolen and 
is potentially being used to harm them financially. 
Failing to publicly disclose the data breach also allowed 
for potential insider trading within Equifax. Three of 
Equifax’s top executives sold nearly $1.8 million of Equifax 
stock in August, which was after Equifax was notified of the 
data breach but prior to its public announcement of the 
breach.147 When the data breach was made public on 
September 7, shares of Equifax dropped around 34.5%, 
falling from $142.72 to $92.98 per share.148 Needless to say, 
these three top executives would not have made nearly as 
much money if they had sold their shares after the public 
announcement of the breach rather than before the 
announcement. This prompted the U.S. Justice Department 
to investigate whether these three top Equifax officials 
violated insider trading laws.149 Equifax’s board of directors 
also formed a special committee to investigate whether the 
three top officials that sold stock in August violated insider 
 
 144. See Gressin, supra note 109. See also, Ron Lieber, How to Protect Yourself 
After the Equifax Breach, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
interactive/2017/your-money/equifax-data-breach-credit.html#second. 
 145. Blanco, supra note 12. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Kevin McCoy, Feds reportedly investigate Equifax executives’ stock sales, 
USA TODAY (Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2017/09/18/ 
feds-reportedly-investigate-equifax-executives-stock-sales/677003001/. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Elena Holodny, The Justice Department has reportedly opened an insider-
trading investigation at Equifax, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 18, 2017), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/equifax-hack-justice-department-investigation-
of-alleged-insider-trading-2017-9. 
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trading laws.150 The committee concluded that none of the 
officials that sold stock engaged in insider trading because 
none of the executives had knowledge of the data breach 
when their trades were made.151 Accordingly, this situation 
highlights another potential problem with failing to notify 
the public of a data breach; it creates a much larger potential 
for insider trading with public companies that are breached. 
The Equifax example illustrates the need for companies to 
disclose data breaches as soon as possible so that not only are 
consumers able to protect themselves, but it also does not 
allow for illegal insider trading activity within the company. 
Finally, in late 2018, the United States House Oversight 
and Government Reform Committee released a report on its 
findings from a fourteen-month investigation into the 2017 
Equifax data breach.152 The report found two main points of 
failure by Equifax.153 First, Equifax’s management structure 
lacked accountability and had no clear lines of authority.154 
This poor structure led to a breakdown in communication 
between the company’s IT policy development and its 
operations.155 Equifax’s second point of failure stemmed from 
its aggressive growth strategy and accumulation of data, 
which resulted in a complex IT environment.156 This growth 
 
 150. Elena Holodny, Equifax says its executives didn’t engage in insider 
trading, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 3, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/equifax-
hack-special-committee-says-no-insider-trading-2017-11. 
 151. Id. 
 152. U.S. H. R. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOV’T REFORM, 115TH CONG., THE 
EQUIFAX DATA BREACH (2018). 
 153. Id. at 4. 
 154. Id. at 4 (“[A] lack of accountability and no clear lines of authority in 
Equifax’s IT management structure existed, leading to an execution gap between 
IT policy development and operation. This also restricted the company’s 
implementation of other security initiatives in a comprehensive and timely 
manner. As an example, Equifax had allowed over 300 security certificates to 
expire, including 79 certificates for monitoring business critical domains.”). 
 155. Id. at 60–71. 
 156. Id. at 4 (“Equifax’s aggressive growth strategy and accumulation of data 
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strategy resulted in Equifax maintaining credit information 
on 820 million customers and more than 91 million 
businesses in 2017.157 With a massive amount of personal 
information in its system, Equifax was a prime target for 
hackers and its complex IT environment left Equifax unable 
to prevent an attack by hackers.158 Accordingly, the report 
found that Equifax failed to implement an adequate security 
program to protect the massive amount of sensitive data 
Equifax held.159 As a result, the report ultimately concluded 
that the Equifax data breach was entirely preventable.160 
The House Oversight Report further concluded that Equifax 
was unprepared to identify, alert, and support affected 
consumers after the breach.161 In all, the House Oversight 
report was damning for Equifax and underscored its many 
shortcomings regarding the 2017 security breach. 
The United States House Oversight and Government 
Reform Committee Report released in December 2018 
reinforced the need for improvement in cybersecurity efforts 
in 2019 and beyond.162 Additionally, the events following the 
 
resulted in a complex IT environment. Equifax ran a number of its most critical 
IT applications on custom-built legacy systems. Both the complexity and 
antiquated nature of Equifax’s IT systems made IT security especially 
challenging. Equifax recognized the inherent security risks of operating legacy 
IT systems because Equifax had begun a legacy infrastructure modernization 
effort. This effort, however, came too late to prevent the breach.”). 
 157. Id. at 15. 
 158. Id. at 18. 
 159. Id. at 2. 
 160. Id.  (“Equifax, however, failed to implement an adequate security program 
to protect this sensitive data. As a result, Equifax allowed one of the largest data 
breaches in U.S. history. Such a breach was entirely preventable.”). 
 161. Id. at 3 (“When Equifax informed the public of the breach on September 
7, the company was unprepared to support the large number of affected 
consumers. The dedicated breach website and call centers were immediately 
overwhelmed, and consumers were not able to obtain timely information about 
whether they were affected and how they could obtain identity protection 
services.”). 
 162. See id. at 94–96 (providing recommendations to prevent data breaches 
and improve cybersecurity). 
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Equifax data breach highlighted the negative effects of a 
data breach. The current United States legal framework does 
not provide any help in alleviating these negative effects of a 
data breach. Therefore, the Equifax data breach provides a 
perfect opportunity for the U.S. legal system to adjust and 
improve consumer protection and cybersecurity efforts in 
America. 
IV. ARTICLE III STANDING IN DATA BREACH CLASS ACTIONS 
AND THE CURRENT PRIVACY LAW LANDSCAPE 
Currently, there are two areas of unsettled law 
significantly affecting companies and individuals involved in 
data breaches. These two areas of the law are: (1) the current 
circuit split regarding Article III standing in data breach 
class action cases and (2) the current privacy law landscape 
in the United States and abroad. First, this Part discusses 
the current circuit split and explains why courts grapple over 
whether consumers’ increased risk of future harm satisfies 
the Constitution’s Article III standing requirements. Then, 
this Part discusses the current privacy law landscape, 
specifically, two new laws implemented in the past year and 
how they affect organizations and consumers. 
A. Article III Standing 
To litigate in federal courts, plaintiffs must meet the 
Article III standing requirements in the United States 
Constitution.163 Article III of the U.S. Constitution limits the 
authority of the federal judges to deciding “cases” and 
“controversies.”164 Article III’s case and controversy 
requirement preserves the separation of powers within the 
three branches of government by preventing the unelected 
judiciary from exercising executive or legislative powers.165 
 
 163. See U.S. CONST. art. III., § 2. 
 164. Id.  
 165. See 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 
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The Supreme Court requires three factors to be met to 
establish Article III standing: (1) “the plaintiff must have 
suffered an ‘injury in fact’—an invasion of a legally protected 
interest[,] which is (a) concrete and particularized . . . and (b) 
‘actual or imminent, not “conjectural” or “hypothetical”’”; (2) 
“there must be a causal connection between the injury and 
the conduct complained of,” meaning “the injury has to be 
‘fairly trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant’”; 
and (3) “it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ 
that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’”166 
This three-part test requires a plaintiff to establish Article 
III standing to satisfy the case-or-controversy requirement 
and thereby preserve the delicate balance of separation of 
powers.167 
Following the 2017 data breach, hundreds of class action 
cases were filed against Equifax in federal and state court.168 
In data breach class action cases, such as the cases Equifax 
faces, plaintiffs allege that the defendant used inadequate 
security to protect the plaintiffs’ personal data from being 
hacked.169 In most cases, the plaintiff cannot prove that a 
hacker has used or sold the data to the plaintiff’s 
detriment.170 Accordingly, the plaintiff alleges that the 
defendant’s failure to protect his personal data has caused 
him damage by increasing the risk of future harm from 
identity theft and imposed costs on the plaintiff when he 
 
3531.3 (3d ed. 2017); Martin H. Redish & Sopan Joshi, Litigating Article III 
Standing: A Proposed Solution to the Serious (But Unrecognized) Separation of 
Powers Problem, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1373, 1375 (2014). 
 166. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
 167. REDISH & JOSHI, supra note 165, at 1375. 
 168. Equifax Inc: Still Defends Suits Over 2017 Data Breach, CLASS ACTION 
REPORTER (Jan. 2, 2019); see generally, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (setting forth rules for 
certifying class actions in federal courts). 
 169. MANK, supra note 8, at 1325. See also 3 IAN C. BALLON, E-COMMERCE & 
INTERNET LAW § 27.07 (Dec. 2017 Update). 
 170. MANK, supra note 8, at 1325. 
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takes measures to prevent future third-party data access.171 
Accordingly, the Equifax class action cases will inevitably 
turn on an analysis of whether the plaintiff’s increased risk 
of future harm satisfies the “injury-in-fact” element of Article 
III standing.172 As such, federal courts will have to decide 
whether the victims of the Equifax data breach had an 
“injury-in-fact” that was “actual or imminent” as well as 
“concrete or particularized.” 
Two recent court cases, Clapper v. Amnesty International 
and Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, have shaped the current legal 
landscape in determining Article III standing in data breach 
cases.173 The current circuit split surrounding the Article III 
standing requirements stems from various circuit courts’ 
interpretation of these two cases. In Clapper, the Supreme 
Court analyzed the “actual or imminent” requirement of 
injury-in-fact for a data breach case,174 whereas Spokeo 
analyzed whether a data breach case met the “concrete or 




 171. Caroline C. Cease, Note, Giving Out Your Number: A Look at the Current 
State of Data Breach Litigation, 66 ALA. L. REV. 395, 399–400 (2014) (discussing 
cases where “plaintiffs’ information has been accessed but that information has 
not been used to open bank accounts, make unauthorized purchases, or otherwise 
harm the plaintiffs. However, these plaintiffs typically claim that they have been 
harmed in other ways: incurring costs for credit-monitoring services, paying the 
costs of cancelling and receiving new bank cards, suffering loss of reward points 
from cancelled cards, and enduring general anxiety that their information will be 
used in the future to make unauthorized purchases.” (footnote omitted)). 
 172. See Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1140 (9th Cir. 2010); 
Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2007); In re Sci. 
Applications Int’l Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape Data Theft Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 14, 
(D.D.C. 2014). 
 173. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1545 (2016); Clapper v. 
Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 398 (2013). 
 174. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 398. 
 175. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. 1540 at 1545. 
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1. Clapper: Injury must be “actual or imminent” for 
standing 
The Supreme Court analyzed the “actual or imminent” 
requirement for Article III standing in a data breach case in 
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA.176 Clapper originates from the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), which 
“allows the Attorney General and Director of National 
Intelligence to acquire foreign intelligence information by 
jointly authorizing the surveillance of individuals who are 
not ‘United States persons’ and are reasonably believed to be 
located outside the United States.”177 In 2008, the FISA 
Amendments Act (50 U.S.C. § 1881a) made two key changes 
to FISA that expanded the government’s power to authorize 
foreign intelligence surveillance.178 The Clapper plaintiffs 
are attorneys and human rights, labor, legal, and media 
organizations, who claim that they engage in sensitive 
international communications with individuals who they 
believe are likely targets of § 1881a surveillance.179 These 
plaintiffs subsequently sued on the day the FISA 
amendments were enacted, seeking a declaration that the 
§ 1881a is unconstitutional. 
The Clapper case turns on whether plaintiffs suffered an 
injury-in-fact and therefore have established Article III 
standing.180 Plaintiffs claim that they have established an 
injury-in-fact because “there is an objectively reasonable 
likelihood that their communications with their foreign 
contacts will be intercepted under § 1881a at some point in 
 
 176. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409. 
 177. Id. at 401. 
 178. Id. at 404 (First, “§ 1881a does not require the [g]overnment to 
demonstrate probable cause that the target of the electronic surveillance is a 
foreign power or agent of a foreign power.” Second, it “does not require the 
government to specify the nature and location of each of the particular facilities 
or places at which the electronic surveillance will occur.”). 
 179. Id. at 406. 
 180. See id. at 407. 
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the future.”181 Justice Alito in his opinion for the Supreme 
Court rejected this argument.182 The Court explained that 
the plaintiffs’ argument for standing rests on a highly 
speculative fear that relies on “a highly attenuated chain of 
possibilities” and therefore does not satisfy the requirement 
that threatened injury must be certainly pending.183 
Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan 
dissented.184 In writing for the dissent, Justice Breyer stated 
that the harm the plaintiffs claim is not speculative.185 
Justice Breyer goes on to explain that based upon the record 
and “commonsense inferences,” there is a very strong 
likelihood that the government will intercept at least some 
of the communications plaintiffs engage in while acting 
under the authority of § 1881a.186 Justice Breyer gives four 
strong reasons why the government will intercept some of 
the communications in the future.187 Therefore, the dissent 
concludes that there is a “high probability” that the 
government will intercept plaintiffs’ communications and 
the plaintiffs’ future harm is not at all speculative.188 
 
 181. Id. at 410. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id.; see also Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 499 (2009) 
(rejecting a standing theory based on a speculative chain of possibilities); 
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990) (reiterating that threatened 
injury must be certainly impending to constitute an injury-in-fact). 
 184. Clapper, 586 U.S. at 422 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 427. 
 187. Id. at 427–29. First, the plaintiffs continue to engage in communication 
that § 1881a authorizes the government to intercept. Second, plaintiffs have a 
strong motive to engage in these conversations and the government has a strong 
motive to listen in on these conversations. Third, the government’s past behavior 
indicates that it will continue to seek information about alleged terrorists and 
detainees “through means that include surveillance of electronic 
communications.” “Fourth, the [g]overnment has the capacity to conduct 
surveillance of the kind at issue here.” 
 188. Id. at 430–31. 
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Addressing the majority’s reasoning that plaintiffs have 
failed to show that injury is certainly impending, the dissent 
argues that certainty is not and has never been the 
“touchstone of standing.”189 The dissent explains that the 
future is uncertain and all that is needed to support standing 
is that future injury is reasonably likely.190 Therefore, 
Justice Breyer concludes his dissent by stating that the word 
“certainly” in “certainly impending” does not mean absolute 
certainty. Rather, the Constitution requires something more 
akin to reasonable probability or high probability to establish 
an injury-in-fact.191 
In footnote 5 of the opinion, the majority acknowledged 
that an allegation of future injury can satisfy the immanency 
requirement if the threatened injury is “certainly 
impending,” or there is a “substantial risk” that harm will 
occur.192 However, the majority ultimately held that 
plaintiffs did not establish that injury is certainly impending 
or that there was a substantial risk that harm will occur 
because plaintiffs relied only on a speculative chain of 
possibilities for injury to occur.193 Therefore, in a close 5-4 
decision, the Supreme Court held that Plaintiffs lacked 
“Article III standing because they cannot demonstrate that 
the future injury that they purportedly fear is certainly 
impending.”194 The result of Clapper’s close 5-4 decision, 
along with the “substantial risk” theory in footnote 5 and 
Justice Breyer’s strong dissent, has led to some lower courts 
applying the alternative substantial risk standard for Article 
 
 189. Id. at 431. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 441. 
 192. Id. at 414, n.5 (majority opinion). See also, Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed 
Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 141 (2010); Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 8 (1988). 
 193. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 414. 
 194. Id. at 422. 
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III standing.195 
2. Spokeo: Injury Must be “Concrete and Particularized” 
for Article III Standing 
The Supreme Court recently explained the concrete and 
particularized standard to establish an injury-in-fact for 
Article III standing in Spokeo Inc. v. Robins.196 This case 
arose from the search engine Spokeo conducting a search on 
plaintiff Robins’ name and the website gathered and 
disseminated inaccurate information about the plaintiff.197 
After Robins discovered that inaccurate information about 
him was distributed, he filed a lawsuit on behalf of himself 
and a class of similarly situated people.198 Robins alleged 
that Spokeo willfully failed to comply with Section 1681e(b) 
of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), which requires 
consumer reporting agencies to “follow reasonable 
procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of 
consumer reports.”199 
The Ninth Circuit held that defendant’s violation of the 
FCRA was sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement 
for Article III standing, even though the plaintiff failed to 
allege any specific damages.200 The Supreme Court then 
granted a writ of certiorari and analyzed the “concrete and 
particularized” requirement for an injury-in-fact to satisfy 
 
 195. See In re Zappos, Inc., 2018 WL 1883212 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that 
plaintiffs established that there is a “substantial risk that harm will occur” to 
satisfy Article III standing); Wikimedia Found. v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 857 F.3d 
193, 200 (4th Cir. 2017) (discussing the substantial risk test from Clapper and 
ultimately holding that injury was too speculative to establish standing); Hedges 
v. Obama, 724 F.3d 170, 196, 201–03 (2d Cir. 2013) (discussing and applying the 
substantial risk test for pre-enforcement review of criminal charges under 
Section 1021 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012). 
 196. Spokeo Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1543 (2016). 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (2010). 
 200. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 413 (9th Cir. 2014). 
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the first element of Article III standing.201 The Court 
explained that for an injury to be particularized an 
individual must have been injured in a “personal and 
individual way.”202 Injury-in-fact must also be concrete.203 
However, the Ninth Circuit did not analyze the concreteness 
requirement. Rather, the Ninth Circuit held that Robins 
alleges concrete de facto injuries because he alleges a 
violation of his own statutory rights, meaning his personal 
interests in the handling of his credit information is 
individualized rather than collective.204 Writing for the 
Supreme Court, Justice Alito rejected the Ninth Circuit’s 
explanation. Justice Alito explained that Robins’ alleged 
concrete de facto injuries concern only whether the injury is 
particularized and not whether it is concrete.205 An injury 
must be real, not abstract, for it to satisfy the concreteness 
requirement for Article III standing.206 The majority opinion 
in Spokeo did not define what exactly constitutes a concrete 
injury. However, citing Clapper, the Court did acknowledge 
that the “risk of real harm” can satisfy the concreteness 
requirement.207 The Court explained that a tort claim can 
exist even if it is difficult to measure or prove.208 Even with 
the risk of real harm analysis, the Supreme Court was not 
moved to hold that Robins had satisfied the concreteness 
requirement.209 
 
 201. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1546 (2016). 
 202. Id. at 1548 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, n.1 
(2016)). 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at 1549. 
 208. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 569, 570 (AM. LAW INS. 
1979), which states that slander per se and libel can be established without 
special harm). 
 209. See id. at 1550. 
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Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the Ninth 
Circuit’s analysis regarding standing in Spokeo was 
incomplete because it failed to address the question of 
whether Robins’ injury met the concreteness requirement for 
Article III standing.210 Accordingly, the Supreme Court 
vacated the Ninth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case 
for further proceedings.211 As a result, the Supreme Court’s 
failure to provide specific guidance on the concreteness 
requirement in Spokeo has left lower courts and attorneys 
struggling to understand what constitutes a concrete 
injury.212 Ultimately, the Spokeo decision leaves open the 
question of whether a data breach without financial losses 
and only increased risk of future harm can constitute a 
concrete injury for Article III standing.213 
3. Circuit Split: Standing in a Data Breach Case 
Following the Supreme Court’s rulings in Clapper and 
Spokeo, circuit courts have been split on the issue of standing 
in a data breach case. Multiple courts have held that 
exposure of consumer data that elevates the risk of identity 
theft is sufficient to establish Article III standing.214 Other 
circuits have held that elevated risk of identity theft is 
 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. See Amy Howe, Opinion analysis: Case on standing and concrete harm 
returns to the Ninth Circuit, at least for now, SCOTUSBLOG (May 16, 2016, 6:45 
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/05/opinion-analysis-case-on-standing-and-
concrete-harm-returns-to-the-ninth-circuit-at-least-for-now/. The author 
discusses how Spokeo, its supporters, and its lawyers were hoping for a “bright-
line” rule, but instead were given a broader ruling in their favor. However, this 
may lead to a more definitive answer on this issue in the near future from the 
Supreme Court. 
 213. Mank, supra note 8, at 1356. 
 214. See Dieffenbach v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 887 F.3d 826 (7th Cir. 2018); In 
re Zappos.com, Inc., 888 F.3d 1020, 1023 (9th Cir. 2018); Attias v. CareFirst Inc., 
865 F.3d 620, 623 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. 
App’x 384 (6th Cir. 2016); Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC 794 F.3d 688, 
690 (7th Cir. 2015). 
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insufficient to establish standing.215 The majority of these 
cases hinge on whether the injury is “actual or imminent” 
and “concrete or particularized” to satisfy the injury-in-fact 
requirement for Article III standing. 
a. Circuit Courts Holding No Standing for Increased Risk of 
Future Harm 
i. Second Circuit: Whalen v. Michael Stores, Inc. 
In Whalen v. Michael Stores, Inc., the Second Circuit 
held that Plaintiff Mary Jane Whalen did not satisfy Article 
III standing because she did not allege a particularized and 
concrete injury.216 Ms. Whalen’s personal information was 
stolen in the Michaels Stores, Inc. 2014 data breach.217 
Although Ms. Whalen’s credit card information was used to 
make fraudulent purchases, she subsequently canceled her 
card and was not liable for her fraudulent purchases.218 
Ms. Whalen claimed, inter alia, that she faces a risk of 
future identity fraud.219 However, the Second Circuit 
rejected Ms. Whalen’s claims because she did not suffer a 
“particular and concrete injury” to satisfy the constitutional 
standing requirements under Article III.220 Ms. Whalen did 
not offer how she could plausibly face a threat of future fraud 
because her stolen credit card was promptly canceled after 
the breach and no other personal information was stolen in 
the breach.221 Therefore, following the Supreme Court’s 
 
 215. See Hutton v. Nat’l Bd. of Exam’rs in Optometry, Inc., 892 F.3d 613 (4th 
Cir. 2018); Alleruzzo v. SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 2017); Beck v. 
McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 267 (4th Cir. 2017); Whalen v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 
689 F. App’x 89 (2d Cir. 2017);  
 216. See Whalen v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 689 F. App’x 89 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 217. Id. at 90. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
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ruling in Clapper, the Second Circuit explained that Ms. 
Whalen did not allege a future injury that is “certainly 
impending” to establish Article III standing.222 Accordingly, 
the Second Circuit held that Ms. Whalen did not suffer an 
injury-in-fact to satisfy the constitutional standing 
requirements and her claims were dismissed.223 
ii. Eighth Circuit: Alleruzzo v. SuperValu, Inc.  
In this case, defendants operated a chain of retail grocery 
stores that suffered two separate cybersecurity breaches, 
which exposed customer credit and debit card information.224 
Subsequently, plaintiffs sued as a class and argued that they 
sufficiently alleged an injury-in-fact because the theft of 
their card information created a substantial risk that they 
would suffer identity theft in the future.225 
Plaintiffs relied on a 2007 Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) report to support their claim that the breach 
created a substantial risk of future harm.226 However, the 
Eighth Circuit found that this report actually did not support 
their claim.227 The Court stated that the GAO report 
concluded that compromised credit and debit card 
information could not be used alone to open new 
unauthorized accounts.228 Additionally, the report found that 
most of the data breaches from 2000 to 2005 have not 
resulted in detected incidents of identity theft.229 In light of 
this information, combined with the Supreme Court’s ruling 
in Clapper, the Eighth Circuit concluded that plaintiffs are 
 
 222. Id. (citing Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013)). 
 223. Id. 
 224. See Alleruzzo v. SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 766 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 225. Id. at 768. 
 226. Id. at 771. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. (quoting U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-07-737). 
 229. Id. 
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not at substantial risk of identity theft and plaintiffs’ 
allegations of future injury do not support standing in this 
case.230 
iii. Fourth Circuit: Beck v. McDonald & Hutton v. 
National Board of Examiners in Optometry, Inc. 
Beck v. McDonald 
This 2017 Fourth Circuit case stems from a laptop 
connected to a pulmonary functioning testing device that was 
stolen from a Veterans Affairs hospital.231 This laptop 
contained encrypted personal information of approximately 
7,400 patients.232 A class action case was subsequently filed 
and plaintiffs sought to establish Article III standing based 
on the increased risk of future identity theft and the cost of 
measures to protect against it.233 
The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that the threat of 
future injury can satisfy Article III standing 
requirements.234 However, the Court held that the threat 
faced by the plaintiffs here was too speculative to establish 
standing.235 The Fourth Circuit explained that, absent 
factual evidence, the assumption that the thieves stole the 
laptop and that the named plaintiffs would have their 
personal information stolen is much too speculative to 
establish standing.236 Additionally, citing footnote 5 in 
 
 230. See id. at 771–72 (citing Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 
(2013) (“[A]llegations of possible future injury are not sufficient.”)). 
 231. Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 267 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 232. Id. at 267. The information in the stolen laptop included birth dates, the 
last four digits of social security numbers, and physical descriptions of patients. 
 233. Id. at 266–67. 
 234. Id. at 271 (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling 
Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 160 (4th Cir. 2000)). 
 235. Id. at 274–75. 
 236. Id. at 274 (“[E]ven after extensive discovery, the Beck plaintiffs have 
uncovered no evidence that the information contained on the stolen laptop has 
been accessed or misused or that they have suffered identity theft, nor, for that 
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Clapper, the Fourth Circuit held that, in this case, standing 
cannot be established from the “substantial risk” that the 
harm from identity theft will occur.237 The Court rejected 
Plaintiffs’ argument that because, overall, 33% of health-
related data breaches result in identity theft, they are at a 
substantial risk of harm to establish standing.238 Finally, the 
Court also rejected Plaintiffs’ claim that the future 
mitigation costs to guard against identity theft do not 
establish standing.239 Therefore, following the ruling in 
Clapper, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
ruling to dismiss the case for lack of standing under Article 
III.240 
Hutton v. National Board of Examiners in Optometry, Inc. 
In June of 2018, the Fourth Circuit held that Plaintiffs’ 
established standing in a data breach case, but not on the 
basis of increased risk of future harm.241 In Hutton, a class 
comprised of optometrists sued the National Board of 
Examiners in Optometry (NBEO) for injuries resulting from 
a data breach at NBEO.242 The district court, citing Beck, 
 
matter, that the thief stole the laptop with the intent to steal their private 
information.”). 
 237. Id. at 275. 
 238. Id. at 275–76 (“Even if we credit the Plaintiffs’ allegation that 33% of those 
affected by Dorn VAMC data breaches will become victims of identity theft, it 
follows that over 66% of veterans affected will suffer no harm. This statistic falls 
far short of establishing a ‘substantial risk’ of harm.”) (citing Khan v. Children’s 
Nat’l Health Sys., 188 F. Supp. 3d 524, 533 (D. Md. 2016) stating ‘general 
allegations . . . that data breach victims are 9.5 times more likely to suffer 
identity theft and that 19 percent of data breach victims become victims of 
identity theft’ insufficient to establish ‘substantial risk’ of harm.”). 
 239. Id. at 276–77 (“Simply put, these self-imposed harms cannot confer 
standing.”) (citing Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC 794 F.3d 688, 694 (7th 
Cir. 2015) “Mitigation expenses do not qualify as actual injuries where the harm 
is not imminent.”). 
 240. Id. at 278. 
 241. See Hutton v. Nat’l Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, Inc. 892 F.3d 613, 617 
(4th Cir. 2018). 
 242. Id. at 617. 
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held that plaintiffs were not injured because they had not 
incurred fraudulent charges nor been denied credit. 
Accordingly, the district court dismissed the Hutton case 
because plaintiffs failed to satisfy the injury-in-fact 
requirement to establish standing.243 On appeal, the Fourth 
Circuit rejected the district court’s ruling that plaintiffs 
suffered no injury.244 The circuit court reasoned that 
plaintiffs had been concretely injured because hackers had 
used, or attempted to use, the plaintiffs’ personal 
information to open fraudulent accounts.245 Therefore, the 
Fourth Circuit in Hutton reversed the district court’s ruling 
and held that plaintiffs’ suffered an injury-in-fact to 
establish Article III standing.246 
With the Beck and Hutton cases in the past two years, 
the Fourth Circuit has struck a middle ground on the issue 
of standing in data breach cases.247 The Fourth Circuit 
distinguished Hutton from Beck by emphasizing that the 
Hutton plaintiffs were “concretely injured” when accounts 
were opened in their name, even though fraudulent charges 
had not occurred. On the other hand, the Beck plaintiffs did 
not have any concrete injury in which their personal 
 
 243. Id. at 618–19. 
 244. See id. at 622. 
 245. Id. (“By way of example, the Hutton Complaint specifies that Hutton 
received an unsolicited Chase Amazon Visa credit card that was applied for using 
her social security number and her maiden name (the name that she had 
provided to the NBEO in 1998). Around the same time, Kaeochinda [a co-
plaintiff] learned that someone had applied for a Chase credit card using her 
social security number and former married name. Mizrahi [a co-plaintiff] also 
actually received an alert that her credit score had decreased eleven points due 
to a credit application that was fraudulently filed with Chase, using her address, 
social security number, and mother’s maiden name.”). 
 246. Id. 
 247. Kevin M. McGinty, Fourth Circuit Decision Seizes Middle Ground on the 
Issue of Standing in Data Breach Cases, THE NAT’L L. REV. (June 20, 2018), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/fourth-circuit-decision-seizes-middle-
ground-issue-standing-data-breach-cases. 
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information was misused.248 Thus, the Fourth Circuit falls in 
the middle on the standing issue, allowing standing for 
plaintiffs that suffer misuse of their stolen personal 
information, but rejecting standing for plaintiffs with an 
increased risk of future harm after a data breach.249 
b. Circuit Courts Holding Standing for Increased Risk of 
Future Harm 
i. D.C. Circuit: Attias v. CareFirst, Inc. 
In 2015 defendant CareFirst, Inc., a group of health 
insurance companies, experienced a data breach when an 
intruder breached twenty-two of its computers containing its 
customers’ personal information.250 Subsequently, seven 
CareFirst customers brought a class action against 
CareFirst, Inc.251 Plaintiffs alleged that the data breach 
exposed them to a heightened risk of identity theft, and 
therefore plaintiffs’ increased risk of future injury is 
substantial enough to create Article III standing.252 
Following the district court’s holding that plaintiffs’ 
theory of injury was too speculative to establish standing, the 
D.C. Circuit reviewed this holding de novo.253 The D.C. 
Circuit explained that the main question is whether 
plaintiffs’ complaint plausibly alleges that the plaintiffs now 
face a substantial risk of identity theft as a result of 
 
 248. Gavejian & Lazzarotti, supra note 113. 
 249. McGinty, supra note 247 (“Hutton reinforces the Fourth Circuit stance 
that misuse must accompany the compromise of personal data, but departs from 
other circuits requiring misuse in that there need not be any pecuniary loss for 
the misuse to confer standing. The inconvenience of having to rectify fraudulent 
credit card accounts was deemed sufficient injury to trigger standing. This 
signals further development of the standing issue in the lower courts which could, 
over time, influence the Supreme Court to agree to weigh in on this question.”). 
 250. See Attias v. CareFirst Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 623 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 251. Id. at 623. 
 252. Id. at 626. 
 253. Id. at 625. 
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CareFirst’s alleged negligence in the data breach.254 Here, 
CareFirst collects and stores credit card and social security 
numbers, as well as other personal identification, and 
personal healthcare information as part of its business.255 
Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that combinations of members’ 
names, birth dates, email addresses, and subscriber 
identification numbers alone qualifies as personal 
information, and the unauthorized access to the combination 
of this information creates a material risk of identity theft 
for plaintiffs.256 For example, a cybercriminal could 
impersonate a victim and obtain medical services in her 
name, leading to inaccuracies in the victim’s medical records, 
which can cause a host of problems for the victim.257 The D.C. 
Circuit agreed with the plaintiffs and held that this 
constitutes a plausible allegation that plaintiffs face a 
substantial risk of identity fraud, “even if their social 
security numbers were never exposed to the data thief.”258 
The D.C. Circuit also clearly distinguished this case from 
Clapper, explaining that in Clapper the plaintiff’s harm 
could only occur through a series of contingent events, none 
of which were alleged to have occurred at the time of the 
lawsuit.259 Whereas here, the cybercriminals have already 
accessed personal identifying data on CareFirst’s servers 
and it is much less speculative to infer that the 
cybercriminals have the intent and ability to use the data to 
 
 254. Id. at 627. 
 255. Id. at 627–28. 
 256. Complaint at 8, Attias v. CareFirst Inc., 865 F.3d 620 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (No. 
1:15-cv-00882-CRC). 
 257. Id. For example, it can lead to a victim having inaccuracies in his or her 
medical record which can cause the victim to receive improper medical care, have 
his or her medical insurance depleted, become disqualified for health or life 
insurance, or even become disqualified for some jobs. 
 258. Attias v. CareFirst Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 259. Id. 
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harm the victims of the breach.260 Thus, the risk to plaintiffs 
here is not based on a long sequence of uncertain certainties; 
rather, a much more substantial risk than the risk presented 
to the Clapper court exists.261 Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit 
held that the claim by the Attias plaintiffs satisfies the 
injury-in-fact requirement for Article III standing.262 
ii. Sixth Circuit: Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. 
In this case, cybercriminals breached Nationwide’s263 
computer network and stole its customers’ personal 
information.264 Following the breach, plaintiffs Mohammad 
Galaria and Anthony Hancox brought a putative class action 
suit.265 The stolen information included names, dates of 
birth, marital statuses, genders, occupations, employers, 
Social Security numbers, and driver’s license numbers.266 
The plaintiffs here allege that the theft of their personal 
data places them at a continuing, increased risk of fraud and 
identity theft.267 Plaintiffs further argue that the risk of 
harm they face is more than the speculative allegations of 
“possible future injury” or “objectively reasonable likelihood” 
that the Supreme Court rejected in Clapper.268 The Sixth 
 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. at 629. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Nationwide is an insurance and financial services company that 
maintains records containing sensitive personal information about its customers, 
as well as potential customers who submit their information to obtain quotes for 
insurance products. See Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 Fed. App’x 384, 
386 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 264. Galaria, 663 Fed. App’x at 386 (“On October 3, 2012, hackers broke into 
Nationwide’s computer network and stole the personal information of Plaintiffs 
and 1.1 million others.”). 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. at 388. 
 268. Id. 
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Circuit acknowledges that it is not certain that plaintiffs’ 
data will be misused, however, the increased risk of future 
harm made it reasonable for plaintiffs to incur mitigation 
costs.269 Plaintiffs must expend time and money to monitor 
their credit, check their bank statements, and modify their 
financial accounts.270 For that reason, this is not a case 
where plaintiffs are manufacturing standing by incurring 
costs in anticipation of non-imminent harm.271 Rather, the 
plaintiffs suffered concrete injuries to mitigate imminent 
harm from the data breach.272 Therefore, following this 
reasoning, the Sixth Circuit held that plaintiffs have suffered 
a concrete injury and satisfied the injury-in-fact requirement 
for Article III standing.273 
iii. Seventh Circuit: Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group 
and Dieffenbach v. Barnes & Noble, Inc. 
Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group 
In 2013, cybercriminals hacked Neiman Marcus, a 
luxury department store, and stole its customers’ credit card 
numbers.274 Following the breach, Hilary Remijas and 
 
 269. Id. (“Thus, although it might not be ‘literally certain’ that Plaintiffs’ data 
will be misused, there is a sufficiently substantial risk of harm that incurring 
mitigation costs is reasonable. Where Plaintiffs already know that they have lost 
control of their data, it would be unreasonable to expect Plaintiffs to wait for 
actual misuse—a fraudulent charge on a credit card, for example—before taking 
steps to ensure their own personal and financial security, particularly when 
Nationwide recommended taking these steps.” (citing footnote 5 of Clapper v. 
Amnesty Intern. USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013) (citations omitted)). 
 270. Id. Nationwide offered to provide some of these monitoring services for a 
limited time, but plaintiffs’ risk is continuing and they have incurred costs to 
continue to protect themselves from identity theft. These continued mitigating 
efforts are needed because following a data breach a reasonable inference can be 
drawn that the hackers will use the victims’ data for fraudulent purposes at some 
point in the future. 
 271. Id. at 389. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. 
 274. See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 690 (7th Cir. 
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several others filed complaints against Neiman Marcus and 
a subsequent class action lawsuit was filed.275 Following the 
district court’s dismissal for lack of Article III standing, the 
Seventh Circuit reviewed the ruling de novo.276 
Plaintiffs claim two imminent injuries: (1) increased risk 
of fraudulent charges and (2) greater susceptibility to 
identity theft.277 Citing Clapper, the Seventh Circuit 
explains that plaintiffs can establish standing for future 
harm if it is certainly impending.278 Further, a substantial 
risk that future injury will occur can establish standing in a 
data breach case.279 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit 
reasoned that it is plausible to infer that plaintiffs have 
shown a substantial risk of harm from the Neiman Marcus 
data breach.280 The Seventh Circuit explained stating, “why 
else would hackers break into a store’s database and steal 
consumers’ private information? Presumably, the purpose of 
the hack is, sooner or later, to make fraudulent charges or 
assume those consumers’ identities.”281 Plaintiffs also claim 
that they lost time and money protecting themselves from 
identity theft and fraudulent charges. In addressing this 
claim, the Seventh Circuit explains that mitigation expenses 
do not qualify as actual injuries where the harm is not 
imminent.282 The Court explains that credit monitoring 
 
2015). Neiman Marcus notified the public of the breach on January 10, 2014, 
stating that 350,000 credit cards had been exposed to the hackers’ malware and 
9,200 of those 350,000 credit cards were known to have been fraudulently used. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. at 691. 
 277. Id. at 692. 
 278. Id. (Allegations of future harm can establish Article III standing if that 
harm is “certainly impending,” but “allegations of possible future injury are not 
sufficient.” (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013))). 
 279. Id. at 693. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. at 694 (citing Clapper, 133 S.Ct. at 1152). 
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services come at a price that is more than de minimus283 and 
therefore qualifies as a concrete injury.284 Therefore, the 
Seventh Circuit held that plaintiffs’ injuries associated with 
resolving fraudulent charges and protection against future 
identity theft constitute an injury-in-fact under Article III 
standing requirements.285 
Dieffenbach v. Barnes & Noble, Inc. 
Dieffenbach stems from a 2012 Barnes & Noble data 
breach where hackers stole customers’ personal 
information.286 The district court first addressed the 
standing issue in this case.287 Citing Remijas, the district 
court held that the Dieffenbach plaintiffs satisfied the 
standing requirement, based on allegations of future 
substantial risk of identity theft and plaintiffs’ lost time and 
money spent to protect against identity theft.288 Defendants 
subsequently appealed to the Seventh Circuit arguing that 
the case should be dismissed for failing to adequately plead 
damages.289 
In addressing the issue on appeal regarding damages, 
the Seventh Circuit also reaffirmed its position on standing 
in this case. The Court stated that “[t]o say that the plaintiffs 
have standing is to say that they have alleged injury in fact, 
and if they have suffered an injury then damages are 
 
 283. See, e.g., EXPERIAN CREDIT MONITORING, supra note 110. Experian credit 
monitoring costs $4.99 for the first month and then $24.99 for the months 
following. 
 284. Remijas, 794 F.3d at 694. 
 285. Id. at 695. 
 286. Dieffenbach v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 887 F.3d 826 (7th Cir. 2018) 
([Cybercriminals] acquired details such as customers’ names, card numbers and 
expiration dates, and PINs.”). 
 287. See In re Barnes & Noble Pin Pad Litig., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137078 
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2016). 
 288. See id. at *9–*11. 
 289. Dieffenbach v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 887 F.3d 826, 828 (7th Cir. 2018). 
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available[.]”290 The Court explained further that plaintiffs 
have standing on three bases: (1) plaintiffs may have 
suffered injury from having to pay for credit monitoring 
services; (2) unauthorized withdrawals that may have 
caused a loss (the time value of money)291 even if the bank 
later restored the principal; or (3) from opportunity cost 
when an individual has to use his own time to monitor and 
correct his bank accounts.292 The Seventh Circuit concluded 
that these three injuries establish standing and also justify 
monetary damages. 
iv. Ninth Circuit: In re Zappos.com, Inc. 
In January of 2012 online retailer Zappos.com, Inc. 
experienced a data breach, where hackers stole the personal 
information of over 24 million Zappos customers.293 The 
plaintiffs in this appeal sued and claimed they established 
standing based on an increased risk of future identity theft, 
even though plaintiffs have not alleged instances of actual 
identity theft or fraud.294 
The Ninth Circuit evaluated Zappos in light of its 
previous ruling in the 2010 case Krottner v. Starbucks Corp. 
and the 2013 Supreme Court ruling in Clapper v. Amnesty 
Int’l USA. In Krottner, a thief stole a laptop containing 
 
 290. Id. 
 291. See Mankiw, supra note 110 at 564–65 (explaining the time value of 
money, of which, at its core, the lesson is that “money today is more valuable than 
the same amount of money in the future.” Therefore, if an individual suffers a 
fraudulent withdrawal at a bank due to a data breach, if the bank simply restores 
the account back to its original balance, the individual has lost the amount of 
interest that could have accrued on the balance due to the time value of money.). 
 292. Dieffenbach v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 887 F.3d 826, 828 (7th Cir. 2018). 
 293. In re Zappos.com, Inc., 888 F.3d 1020, 1023 (9th Cir. 2018) 
(Cybercriminals “stole the names, account numbers, passwords, email addresses, 
billing and shipping addresses, telephone numbers, and credit and debit card 
information[.]”). 
 294. See id. at 1024. 
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personal information of 97,000 Starbucks employees.295 The 
Krottner plaintiffs sued, and their only harm to establish 
standing was an increased risk of future identity theft.296 
The Ninth Circuit in Krottner held that this increased risk of 
future harm was sufficient to establish standing because, 
with their personally identifiable information in the hands of 
a hacker, plaintiffs had alleged a credible threat of real and 
immediate harm.297 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held that 
Krottner is distinguishable from Clapper and subsequently 
followed the reasoning in Krottner in this case.298 Unlike 
Clapper, the plaintiffs’ injuries in Krottner and Zappos do not 
require a speculative multi-chain link of inferences.299 
Rather, here in Zappos, hackers have the means to commit 
identity theft with plaintiffs’ stolen personal information.300 
Therefore, following the ruling in Krottner, the Ninth Circuit 
held that plaintiffs’ increased risk of future identity theft 
established Article III standing.301 
B. The Current Privacy Law Landscape 
The second area of unsettled law surrounding data 
breaches is the current privacy law landscape. As stated 
 
 295. Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1140 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 296. Id. at 1142. 
 297. Id. at 1143. 
 298. See In re Zappos.com, Inc., 888 F.3d at 1126. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Id. at 1127 (“Although there is no allegation in this case that the stolen 
information included social security numbers, as there was in Krottner, the 
information taken in the data breach still gave hackers the means to commit 
fraud or identity theft, as Zappos itself effectively acknowledged by urging 
affected customers to change their passwords on any other account where they 
may have used “the same or a similar password.” (citation omitted)). See also, id. 
at 1128–29 (“Plaintiffs also specifically allege that ‘[a] person whose PII has been 
obtained and compromised may not see the full extent of identity theft or identity 
fraud for years.’ And ‘it may take some time for the victim to become aware of the 
theft.’”). 
 301. Id. at 1128. 
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previously, there are fifty separate data breach notification 
statutes, all with varying degrees of severity.302 In addition 
to these notification statutes, two significant privacy laws 
were enacted in the past year. These laws are: (1) the 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)303 and (2) the 
California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA).304 These laws 
have a significant impact on organizations and individuals 
throughout the world. As U.S. citizens and lawmakers begin 
to realize the gravity of security breaches, these two laws will 
provide an example for the U.S. Congress and pave the way 
for a uniform federal privacy law. 
1. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 
The world’s strongest data protection rules were passed 
into law when the General Data Protection Regulation was 
adopted by the European Parliament and the European 
Council in April 2016.305 Following the ratification of the 
GDPR, there was a two-year transition period to allow 
organizations to adapt to the new rule and change their 
methods, policies, procedures, and documentation to meet 
the new requirements.306 Then, on May 25, 2018, the GDPR 
came into full force and covered organizations are now 
required to comply with the GDPR in its entirety or face 
penalty.307 
The GDPR intended to “harmonize” data privacy laws in 
 
 302. See supra pp. 1139–42 and accompanying notes. 
 303. Commission Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L119) [hereinafter GDPR]. 
 304. California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (“CCPA”), CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798 
(2018) [hereinafter CCPA]. 
 305. GDPR, supra note 303. See also Matt Burgess, What is GDPR? The 
Summary Guide to GDPR Compliance in the UK, WIRED (Jan. 21, 2019), 
https://www.wired.co.uk/article/what-is-gdpr-uk-eu-legislation-compliance-
summary-fines-2018. 
 306. BALLON, supra note 169, at § 26.04[18][A]. 
 307. See Francoise Gilbert, Global Privacy and Security Law, Ch. 6A “EU Data 
Protection Regulation” (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business Publishing). 
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Europe as well as protect and empower all EU citizens’ data 
privacy.308 The GDPR advanced these intentions by creating 
eight rights for individuals regarding personal information 
security.309 The most notable rights created are the right to 
be forgotten, which allows an individual to have its personal 
information removed from an organization; the right to 
access, which gives individuals the right to know exactly 
what information is held about them and how it is processed; 
and the right to be informed, which requires all 
organizations to be completely transparent in how they are 
using personal data.310 Outside of the eight individual rights, 
the GDPR also protects individuals by requiring all 
companies that collect or process EU citizens’ personal data 
to appoint a data protection officer.311 The data protection 
officer at each company is responsible for overseeing the data 
protection strategy and implementation to ensure 
compliance with GDPR requirements.312 
 
 308. EU GDPR, https://eugdpr.org/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2019). 
 309. INFO. COMM’RS OFFICE, https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-
protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/individual-
rights/ (visited Feb. 24, 2019) (These eight rights for individuals include: (1) the 
right to be informed; (2) the right of access; (3) the right to rectification; (4) the 
right to erasure; (5) the right to restrict processing; (6) the right to data 
portability; (7) the right to object; (8) rights in relation to automated decision 
making and profiling.). 
 310. See id. 
 311. GDPR, supra note 303, at art. 37. 
 312. Nate Lord, What is a Data Protection Officer (DPO)? Learn About the New 
Role Required for GDPR Compliance in 2019, DIGITAL GUARDIAN (Jan. 23, 2019), 
https://digitalguardian.com/blog/what-data-protection-officer-dpo-learn-about-
new-role-required-gdpr-compliance. The data protection officer’s responsibilities 
include, but are not limited to, the following: 
Educating the company and employees on important compliance 
requirements;  
Training staff involved in data processing;  
Conducting audits to ensure compliance and address potential issues 
proactively;  
Serving as the point of contact between the company and GDPR 
Supervisory Authorities;  
Monitoring performance and providing advice on the impact of data 
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Arguably, the most significant regulation from the 
GDPR is the high standard it created for notifying 
individuals after a breach. The GDPR requires an 
organization to notify the relevant regulator within seventy-
two hours of discovering the data breach.313 This notification 
must include a description of the nature of the breach, the 
estimated impact of the breach, the name and details of the 
data protection officer, and a description of the measures 
taken by the organization to address the breach.314 Finally, 
noncompliance with any of the GDPR regulations will result 
in significant fines.315 The GDPR fines are a tiered system 
with lower tier fines of €10 million or 2% of annual revenues, 
whichever is greater, for noncompliance of Articles 8, 11, 25–
39, and 41–43.316 The higher tiered fines are €20 million or 
 
protection efforts;  
Maintaining comprehensive records of all data processing activities 
conducted by the company, including the purpose of all processing 
activities, which must be made public on request.  
Id.; see also GDPR, supra note 303, at art. 37. 
 313. GDPR, supra note 303, at art. 33(1). (“In the case of a personal data 
breach, the controller shall without undue delay and, where feasible, not later 
than 72 hours after having become aware of it, notify the personal data breach to 
the supervisory authority competent in accordance with Article 55, unless the 
personal data breach is unlikely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of 
natural persons. Where the notification to the supervisory authority is not made 
within 72 hours, it shall be accompanied by reasons for the delay.”). 
 314. GDPR, supra note 303, at art. 33(3). 
The notification referred to in paragraph 1 shall at least: 
1. describe the nature of the personal data breach including where 
possible, the categories and approximate number of data subjects 
concerned and the categories and approximate number of personal data 
records concerned; 
2. communicate the name and contact details of the data protection 
officer or other contact point where more information can be obtained; 
3. describe the likely consequences of the personal data breach; 
4. describe the measures taken or proposed to be taken by the controller 
to address the personal data breach, including, where appropriate, 
measures to mitigate its possible adverse effects. 
Id. 
 315. See GDPR, supra note 303, at art. 83. 
 316. See id. at art. 83(4). (“Infringements of the following provisions shall, in 
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4% of annual revenues, whichever is greater, for 
noncompliance of Articles 5, 6, 7, 9, 12–22, and 44–49.317 As 
a result, these fines create a large incentive for companies to 
stay diligent and comply with all GDPR regulations. 
Although the GDPR has significantly increased 
protection for individuals and their personal information, it 
is not perfect nor without criticism.318 One criticism of the 
GDPR is that it does not even achieve its goal of harmonizing 
all of the data protection laws in the EU.319 Of the sixty-five 
articles that relate to the rights of data subjects, thirty of 
them allow member states to engage in variation from the 
standard set in the GDPR.320 Accordingly, there is the 
potential that multiple member states will deviate from the 
norm and thereby destroy the harmonization of all data 
 
accordance with paragraph 2, be subject to administrative fines up to 10,000,000 
EUR, or in the case of an undertaking, up to 2% of the total worldwide annual 
turnover of the preceding financial year, whichever is higher: (a) the obligations 
of the controller and the processor pursuant to Articles 8, 11, 25 to 39 and 42 and 
43; (b) the obligations of the certification body pursuant to Articles 42 and 43; (c) 
the obligations of the monitoring body pursuant to Article 41(4).”). 
 317. See id. at art. 83(5). (“Infringements of the following provisions shall, in 
accordance with paragraph 2, be subject to administrative fines up to 20,000,000 
EUR, or in the case of an undertaking, up to 4 % of the total worldwide annual 
turnover of the preceding financial year, whichever is higher: (a) the basic 
principles for processing, including conditions for consent, pursuant to Articles 5, 
6, 7 and 9; (b) the data subjects’ rights pursuant to Articles 12 to 22; (c) the 
transfers of personal data to a recipient in a third country or an international 
organization pursuant to Articles 44 to 49; (d) any obligations pursuant to 
Member State law adopted under Chapter IX; (e) non-compliance with an order 
or a temporary or definitive limitation on processing or the suspension of data 
flows by the supervisory authority pursuant to Article 58(2) or failure to provide 
access in violation of Article 58(1).”). 
 318. David Bender, GDPR Harmonization: Reality or Myth?, IAPP: PRIVACY 
PERSPECTIVES (June 7, 2018), https://iapp.org/news/a/gdpr-harmonization-
reality-or-myth/. 
 319. See id.; see also Katie Nolan, GDPR: Harmonization or Fragmentation? 
Applicable Law Problems in EU Data Protection Law, Berkeley TECH. L. J. BLOG 
(Jan. 20, 2018), http://btlj.org/2018/01/gdpr-harmonization-or-fragmentation-
applicable-law-problems-in-eu-data-protection-law/. 
 320. Bender, supra note 318. 
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protection laws in the EU.321 As a result, the GDPR will not 
achieve its goal of having a “single set of rules” allowing 
businesses to save costs on compliance.322 Just the opposite 
has occurred. Therefore, the GDPR will not achieve 
harmonization if member states continue to deviate, thereby 
making compliance more burdensome and costly for 
businesses.323 
The GDPR’s failure to achieve harmonization adds to the 
already concerning problem that GDPR compliance is too 
burdensome on organizations and the extremely costly 
penalties will have detrimental consequences on business.324 
 
 321. Id. (“National legislation is needed to select among the variations 
permitted in the GDPR itself. At this writing, only a minority of member states 
have enacted this implementing legislation—although all 28 were to have it in 
place by May 25, 2018—and some others have draft legislation. We do not yet 
know the degree of diversity that will actually be introduced by selecting 
variations, but the potential for diversity is great. After all, the fact that a 
diversion from the norm is included in a particular article suggests that there 
may have been at least one member state that lobbied for it.”). 
 322. Commission Proposes a Comprehensive Reform of Data Protection Rules 
to Increase Users’ Control of Their Data and to Cut Costs for Businesses, European 
Commission Press Release IP/12/46 (Jan. 25, 2012), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-12-46_en.htm (This 2012 proposal aimed for the GDPR to be a “single 
law [that] will do away with the current fragmentation and costly administrative 
burdens, leading to savings for businesses of around €2.3 billion a year.”). 
 323. See Nolan, supra note 319 (arguing that in the future national data 
protection laws will continue to diverge). (“The EU legislature’s aim to create a 
single set of rules has not come to fruition. While there is a great deal more 
convergence on the substance of EU data protection law compared to under the 
Data Protection Directive, it is by no means a complete harmonization. The 
practical reality is that national data protection laws will continue to diverge. 
While a complex co-operation and consistency mechanism has been designed to 
determine the division of responsibilities between data protection authorities, the 
GDPR is silent as to when the national data protection legislation will apply. In 
the absence of any applicable law rule, organizations will face considerable 
uncertainty as to their legal obligations.”). 
 324. See Larry Downes, GDPR and the End of the Internet’s Grand Bargain, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (April 9, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/04/gdpr-and-the-end-of-the-
internets-grand-bargain; Daphne Keller, The New, Worse ‘Right to be Forgotten’, 
POLITICO EU (Jan. 27, 2016 7:28 PM), https://www.politico.eu/article/right-to-be-
forgotten-google-defense-data-protection-privacy/ (Daphne Keller, former 
associate general counsel at Google criticizes the “right to be forgotten.”); see also 
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Many in the technology industry fear that the GDPR’s strict 
regulations could push small and medium-sized competitors 
out of the industry.325 This is because companies spent 
hundreds of hours becoming compliant with the GDPR, 
costing many companies over $1 million dollars.326 
Accordingly, compliance alone is extremely time-consuming 
and costly for small and medium-sized businesses.327 Then, 
if a company slips up and is found non-compliant, it will face 
an enormous fine under Article 83.328 In sum, this time and 
money spent on compliance with the GDPR takes away 
valuable resources that a company could be using to grow its 
business. Therefore, it is a legitimate and well-founded fear 
that the GDPR’s strict regulations could cause small and 
 
In GDPR Compliance, U.S. Companies Lag Behind United Kingdom, EU, CORP. 
COUNSEL (July 12, 2018) (criticizing the cost of complying with the GDPR). 
 325. Caroline Spiezio, An American GDPR? Companies’ Privacy Gurus Discuss 
Future Federal Data Law in DC, CORP. COUNSEL (Sept. 26, 2018 3:57 PM), 
https://www.law.com/corpcounsel/2018/09/26/an-american-gdpr-companies-
privacy-gurus-discuss-future-federal-data-law-in-d-c/. 
 326. See id. (quoting Google’s chief privacy officer Keith Enright stating that 
“Google’s preparations for GDPR had taken ‘hundreds of years of human time,’ 
time smaller companies may not have to spare.”); see also Dan Clark, In GDPR 
Compliance, US Companies Lag Behind United Kingdom, EU, CORP. COUNSEL 
(July 12, 2018 1:23 PM), https://www.law.com/corpcounsel/2018/07/12/in-gdpr-
compliance-u-s-companies-lag-behind-united-kingdom-eu/ (“Twenty-five percent 
of U.S. respondents spent over $1 million on becoming compliant with the 
GDPR.”). 
 327. See Spiezio, supra note 325. See also Hearing on Protecting Consumer 
Privacy in the Era of Big Data Before the H. Comm. On Energy and Commerce 
and S. Comm. On Consumer Protection and Commerce, 116th Cong. (2019) 
(statement by Roslyn Layton, Visiting Scholar, THE AM. ENTER. INST.) (“There is 
little to no data that shows that small to medium sized companies are growing in 
the EU as a result of the regulation. The European Commission’s Digital 
Scoreboard reports shows a consistent lag in the SME [small to medium 
enterprise] segment, particularly to modernize their websites and market outside 
their own EU countries. One study suggests that small- and medium-sized ad 
tech competitors have lost up to one-third of their market position since the 
GDPR took effect. [ . . . ] The GDPR is a barrier to market entry that punishes 
small firms, rewards large ones, and creates a cozy relationship between 
regulators and the firms they regulate.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 328. See GDPR, supra note 303, at art. 83. 
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medium-sized businesses to fail. 
2. The California Consumer Privacy Act 
Following the lead of the EU’s GDPR, California enacted 
the most comprehensive privacy law in the United States 
when it passed the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) 
in June 2018.329 The law does not go into effect until January 
1, 2020, which allows companies to adapt to the changes in 
the law.330 Similar to the GDPR, the CCPA creates new data 
privacy rights for California consumers. These data privacy 
rights include the rights to know, access, delete, and opt out 
of the sale of personal information.331 Also similar to the 
GDPR, the CCPA imposes penalties on companies that 
violate the law. If a company is found in violation of the 
CCPA, it will have thirty days to cure any violation after 
being notified of the alleged noncompliance.332 Then, if a 
company fails to cure any violation within thirty days, it can 
face a civil penalty up to $7,500 for every intentional 
violation.333 Additionally, the CCPA provides consumers a 
private right of action that allows consumers, either 
individually or as a class, to seek statutory or actual damages 
and injunctive relief, if their personal information is subject 
to unauthorized access.334 
Unlike the GDPR, the CCPA does not apply to all 
businesses in the United States, nor all the businesses in 
California. First, the CCPA only applies to for-profit 
 
 329. CCPA, supra note 304. 
 330. See Mark G. McCreary, The California Consumer Privacy Act: What You 
Need to Know, N. J. L. J. (Dec. 1, 2018 10:00 AM), https://www.law.com/njlaw 
journal/2018/12/01/the-california-consumer-privacy-act-what-you-need-to-
know/. 
 331. CCPA, supra note 304, at §§ 1798.100–1798.120. 
 332. Id. at § 1785.155. 
 333. Id. at § 1785.155. 
 334. Id. at § 1798.150. 
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organizations that conduct business in California.335 Second, 
for the CCPA to apply, an organization must satisfy at least 
one of the following three criteria: (1) have an annual gross 
revenue in excess of $25 million; (2) receive or disclose the 
personal information of 50,000 or more California residents, 
households or devices on an annual basis; or (3) derive fifty 
percent or more of their annual revenues from selling 
California residents’ personal information.336 Therefore, the 
CCPA provides strict rules for large for-profit organizations 
doing business in California but does not apply these rules to 
small businesses or non-profit organizations. 
Another difference between the GDPR and CCPA is that 
the CCPA does not provide a data breach notification 
requirement. Rather, the California legislature chose to 
continue with its own data breach notification statute that 
has been the law since 2003.337 This notification law requires 
that an organization notify customers of a data breach and 
specifically sets forth the manner in which an organization 
is to notify those affected by the breach.338 However, 
 
 335. See McCreary, supra note 330. 
 336. CCPA, supra note 304, at § 1798.140(c). 
 337. See CAL. CIV. CODE 1798.82. 
 338. Id. at 1798.82(d).  
A person or business that is required to issue a security breach 
notification pursuant to this section shall meet all of the following 
requirements: 
(1) The security breach notification shall be written in plain language, 
shall be titled “Notice of Data Breach,” and shall present the information 
described in paragraph (2) under the following headings: “What 
Happened,” “What Information Was Involved,” “What We Are Doing,” 
“What You Can Do,” and “For More Information.” Additional 
information may be provided as a supplement to the notice. 
(A) The format of the notice shall be designed to call attention to the 
nature and significance of the information it contains. 
(B) The title and headings in the notice shall be clearly and 
conspicuously displayed. 
(C) The text of the notice and any other notice provided pursuant to this 
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California’s data breach notification law does not provide a 
time requirement to notify individuals of a data breach, 
rather it simply requires disclosure “be made in the most 
expedient time possible and without unreasonable 
delay[.]”339 Therefore, the California legislature punted the 
opportunity to clarify the required time for an organization 
to notify individuals of a data breach. 
The CCPA has been praised for providing better data 
protection to California residents but also criticized by 
businesses that will need to comply with the law.340 The main 
concern is that the law is much too broad and ambiguous. 
Namely, the CCPA’s definitions of “business” and “personal 
information” are criticized.341 The CCPA’s definition of 
“business” is a concern because, as presently written, the 
CCPA could not only apply to organizations that sell 
individuals’ data for financial gain but also any website that 
collects IP addresses from millions of unique visitors each 
day.342 Accordingly, this broad definition could pull in a 
website that does not conduct business in California but 
simply has a website that collects IP addresses from its 
visitors in California. As a result, this will put an enormous 
burden on these websites to comply with a law that they did 
 
section shall be no smaller than 10-point type. 
Id. 
 339. Id. at 1798.82(a). 
 340. Allison Grande, Don’t Water Down Calif. Privacy Law, Lawmakers Told, 
LAW360 (Dec. 5, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1108475/don-t-water-
down-calif-privacy-law-lawmakers-told (reporting that many advocacy groups 
applaud the law for being a “privacy leader” in America). Whereas, others in 
industry criticized portions of the law. Id. (“The California Chamber of Commerce 
and other business groups from a range of industry sectors in August asked 
lawmakers to rein in some of the more ‘unworkable’ aspects of the statute, 
including its broad definition of personal information and its application to a wide 
range of data uses.”). 
 341. See CCPA, supra note 304, at § 1785.140(c), (o). 
 342. Danny Allan, California’s New Data Privacy Law Could Begin a 
Regulatory Disaster, FORTUNE (Oct. 23, 2018), https://fortune.com/2018/10/23/ 
california-data-privacy-law-gdpr/. 
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not foresee. 
A concern greater than the CCPA’s definition of business 
is the law’s enormously broad definition of “personal 
information.”343 Under the CCPA’s definition of personal 
information, the law is not limited to a company’s customers. 
Essentially, if a company physically or virtually touches a 
California resident, it will be subject to the CCPA.344 Under 
the CCPA, the term “personal information” includes any 
“information that identifies, relates to, describes, is capable 
of being associated with, or could reasonably be linked, 
directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer or 
household.”345 This overly broad definition of personal 
information includes any information that could be linked 
with a person, which essentially is all information.346 This 
makes the entire compliance with the CCPA very confusing 
for American businesses. Although this broad definition was 
intended to protect as much consumer personal information 
as possible, it could actually “undermine important privacy-
protective practices like encouraging companies to handle 
data in a way that is not directly linked to a consumer’s 
 
 343. See CCPA, supra note 304, at § 1785.140(o). 
 344. See Landmark New Privacy Law in California to Challenge Businesses 
Nationwide, JD SUPRA (July 5, 2018), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/ 
landmark-new-privacy-law-in-california-99847/ (The CCPA encompasses all 
California residents, including employees, customers, visitors to a company 
internet site or business location, contractors and independent contractors, and 
vendors.). 
 345. See CCPA, supra note 304, at § 1785.140(o)(1)(A); see also CCPA, supra 
note 304, at § 1785.140(o)(1)(B)–(K) (Personal information under the CCPA 
includes but is not limited to: records of personal property; products or services 
purchased, obtained, or considered; other purchasing or consuming histories or 
tendencies; biometric information; internet or other electronic network activity 
information (e.g., browsing and search history, and information regarding an 
individual’s interaction with a website, application, or advertisement); 
geolocation data; and professional or employment-related information.). 
 346. Spiezio, supra note 325. (“CCPA’s definition of ‘personal information’ goes 
beyond information that actually identifies a person to include any information 
that ‘could be linked with a person,’ which arguably is all information.” (quoting 
Amazon’s Vice President and Associate General Counsel Andrew Devore)). 
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identity.”347 Therefore, the CCPA’s broad definition of 
“personal information” will make compliance with the law 
burdensome and costly, and potentially reduce data 
protection for California residents. 
V. PROPOSED SOLUTION: SUPREME COURT ADDRESSING 
CIRCUIT SPLIT AND A FEDERAL PRIVACY LAW 
Current U.S. laws have failed to protect consumers and 
facilitate stronger cybersecurity efforts. The ambiguous and 
complex regulatory environment of cybersecurity law has 
created a host of problems for both consumers and U.S. 
businesses. These issues, as well as the increased prevalence 
of data breaches, make it clear that change is needed to make 
laws more effective and provide better protection for 
consumers. This Comment proposes two changes in the law 
as a solution. The first change is for the Supreme Court to 
provide a clear rule on Article III standing in a data breach 
case. The second change is for Congress to pass a uniform 
federal privacy law. The following subsections will explore 
how these two changes will improve consumer protection by 
providing incentives for companies to take action and protect 
consumers both before and after a data breach. 
A. Supreme Court Ruling Addressing Article III Standing in 
Data Breach Class Action Cases 
The current circuit split on Article III standing in data 
breach cases leaves consumers with an uphill battle to hold 
the company which neglected to protect their personal 
information liable.348 Therefore, the first action that can be 
taken is for the Supreme Court to follow the D.C., Sixth, 
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits and allow the increased risk of 
future injury to constitute an injury-in-fact for Article III 
 
 347. Id. 
 348. See supra Section II.B. 
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standing.349 
The Supreme Court may have this opportunity with the 
class action lawsuits filed against Equifax. The facts 
surrounding the Equifax data breach coincide with the 
rulings in Attias, Galaria, Remijas, and Zappos. In each of 
those cases, the circuit court held that the threat of future 
harm from identity theft was sufficient to establish Article 
III standing.350 Additionally, in those cases, cybercriminals 
hacked into each defendant company’s system to steal 
personal information of its customers such as names, dates 
of birth, Social Security numbers, and driver’s licenses.351 
These circuit courts all held that the threat of future harm 
resulting from the breach and the costs of mitigating future 
damages constituted an injury-in-fact for Article III 
standing.352 Similarly, with the Equifax breach, 
cybercriminals stole names, Social Security numbers, birth 
dates, addresses, and driver’s license numbers.353 Therefore, 
the victims of the Equifax data breach also have a threat of 
future harm resulting from the data breach and will incur 
costs to mitigate damages such as credit monitoring.354 
The rulings in Attias, Galaria, and Remijas also provide 
logical legal reasoning for why increased risk of future injury 
constitutes an injury-in-fact. First and foremost, the entire 
purpose of a hack is to make fraudulent charges or assume 
 
 349. See Attias v. CareFirst Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 629–30 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Galaria 
v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384, 390–91 (6th Cir. 2016); Remijas v. 
Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 698–97 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 350. See Attias, 865 F.3d at 629–30; Galaria, 663 F. App’x at 390–91; Remijas, 
794 F.3d at 698–97. 
 351. See Attias, 865 F.3d at 629–30; Galaria, 663 F. App’x at 390–91; Remijas, 
794 F.3d at 698–97. 
 352. See Attias, 865 F.3d at 629–30; Galaria, 663 F. App’x at 390–91; Remijas, 
794 F.3d at 698–97. 
 353. EQUIFAX, supra note 2. 
 354. See Villadiego, supra note 133; EXPERIAN CREDIT MONITORING, supra note 
110. 
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consumers’ identities at some point.355 A cybercriminal’s 
motive for hacking a system is to use the stolen information 
for their benefit or to sell it to others who can also use the 
information to make fraudulent charges.356 Therefore, an 
injury is “certainly impending” for a consumer whose data 
has been breached, satisfying the immanency requirement 
for an injury-in-fact under Article III standing.357 
Additionally, any rational consumer would take the proper 
steps to protect themselves from future harm after a breach 
by monitoring their credit, checking their bank statements, 
and modifying their financial accounts. As stated previously, 
these mitigation efforts are not free358 and but for the data 
breach, consumers would not incur the additional costs to 
monitor their credit and other financial information.359 
Accordingly, these costs are certainly an actual injury that 
satisfies the “concrete and particularized” requirement for 
Article III standing.360 Therefore, it is sound law and logical 
 
 355. Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693. 
 356. Kristen L. Burge, Your Data Was Stolen, But Not Your Identity (Yet), ABA 
(Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/publications/ 
litigation-news/featured-articles/2018/your-data-was-stolen-not-your-identity-
yet/ (“A majority of circuits reason that ‘there is a “certainly impending” threat 
that the affected individuals will be the victims of financial or identity fraud. 
After all, the motive of the hackers is to use the stolen information for their own 
benefit or to sell it to others,’ explains Newby. These circuits apply common sense 
to data breach cases, Newby suggests. ‘The entire purpose of hacking a company 
to swipe thousands of credit card numbers or personal identifiers is to misuse 
that information for gain, like making fraudulent purchases or engaging in tax 
refund fraud or identity fraud. Why should the people whose information was 
compromised have to wait until that happens before getting some relief?’” quoting 
Tyler G. Newby co-chair of the ABA Section of Litigation’s Privacy & Data 
Security Committee); see also Villadiego, supra note 133 (discussing how 
cybercriminals will use the information stolen in the Equifax data breach). 
 357. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 414 (2013). 
 358. See EXPERIAN CREDIT MONITORING, supra note 110. 
 359. See Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693. 
 360. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016). See also Remijas, 
794 F.3d at 694 (holding that credit monitoring following a data breach 
constitutes a concrete injury); Galaria, 663 Fed. App’x at 389 (holding that 
plaintiffs suffered concrete injuries to mitigate imminent harm from the data 
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thinking for the Supreme Court to hold that the victims of 
the Equifax data breach have suffered an injury-in-fact 
under Article III standing requirements. If the Supreme 
Court is able to rule on the Article III standing requirements 
in a data breach case, it will bring clarity to the law and allow 
victims of a data breach to have their day in court. This will 
give data breach victims the opportunity to hold the company 
that did not protect their personal information liable. 
In addition to giving data breach victims their day in 
court, allowing for Article III standing in a data breach case 
will incentivize companies to improve their cybersecurity 
efforts to prevent future data breaches. Although some argue 
that class action lawsuits do not act as a deterrence,361 there 
is sound rationale and evidence that class actions deter 
companies from bad behavior.362 Allowing for Article III 
standing in data breach cases based on the threat of future 
injury will lead to more class action cases against companies 
that have their data breached. The threat of future class 
action litigation will then act as a general deterrence363 for 
 
breach). 
 361. See Linda S. Mullenix, Ending Class Actions as We Know Them: 
Rethinking the American Class Action, 64 EMORY L.J. 399, 420–21 (2014). 
 362. Fitzpatrick, supra note 14. Fitzpatrick explains the legal theory of 
deterrence and provides evidence that class actions deter wrongdoing. In a 1981 
study, economists found that settlements from class actions for price fixing were 
10 times greater than government imposed fines and that a deterrent effect came 
from the threat of an award of private treble damages (citing Michael Kent Block 
et al., The Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement, 89 J. OF POL. ECON. 429, 441 
(1981). Additionally, a recent study in 2010 of American securities fraud class 
action lawsuits found that class action lawsuits induced companies to be more 
forthcoming to their shareholders (citing James P. Naughton et al., Private 
Litigation Costs and Voluntary Disclosure: Evidence From the Morrison Ruling, 
(May 2014) (unpublished paper on file with Kellog School of Management, 
Working Paper updated February 2017))). 
 363. Fitzpatrick, supra note 14. General deterrence refers to how potential 
wrongdoers respond to a potential lawsuit—that is, do potential wrongdoers 
decide not to commit misconduct to begin with because they are afraid of lawsuits 
against them? Whereas, specific deterrence is how an actual wrongdoer responds 
to an actual lawsuit against it—that is, does the actual wrongdoer stop the 
misbehavior after it is caught? 
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these companies. The theory of general deterrence assumes 
that people, and therefore people running companies, are 
rational and that a rational person does not want to be 
sued.364 With a lawsuit, a company will have to pay its own 
lawyers and the plaintiff if it loses in court.365 Therefore, if 
the misbehavior benefits the corporation less than the harm 
it inflicts on others, then the corporation will rationally 
choose not to engage in the misconduct.366 Consequently, 
under the theory of general deterrence, the only time a 
corporation will rationally choose to engage in misconduct is 
when the benefits outweigh the harm.367 
In the context of data breaches, companies are not 
engaging in deliberate misconduct per se. Rather, companies 
are not putting the proper protections in place to adequately 
protect their customers’ sensitive personal information. 
Applying the general deterrence theory to data breaches 
means that class action litigation needs to deter companies 
by having the cost of a class action lawsuit outweigh the cost 
of putting in place more cybersecurity protections.368 
Currently, there is not enough general deterrence for 
organizations in America because the law is inconsistent 
regarding Article III standing and not every circuit allows for 
standing based on the threat of future harm.369 Therefore, 
companies do not always have to pay for costly class action 
litigation or treble damages if they lose in court because the 
class action case does not even make it to the courtroom 
without Article III standing. In short, there is not enough 
incentive for companies to improve their consumer data 
protection efforts because some circuits do not allow for 
 
 364. Id. 
 365. Id. 
 366. Id. 
 367. Id. 
 368. See id. 
 369. See Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 277–78 (4th Cir. 2017); Whalen v. 
Michaels Stores, Inc., 689 F. App’x 89, 90–91 (2d Cir. 2017). 
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Article III standing when a breach occurs. 
If the Supreme Court were to resolve the current circuit 
split and rule that increased risk of future harm from a data 
breach satisfies the Article III standing requirements, it 
would allow more consumers to file class actions that survive 
a motion to dismiss and actually make it to discovery. This 
will provide an initial remedy for breached consumers 
because they will be able to hold the company that did not 
protect their data accountable. Additionally, it will make 
litigation costlier for companies that experience a breach 
because they will no longer be able to win on a motion to 
dismiss. Then, applying the theory of general deterrence, 
more lawsuits will incentivize companies to improve their 
cybersecurity efforts to better protect consumer information 
because the potential cost of litigation will outweigh the cost 
of protecting consumer information.370 As a result, the 
companies’ improved cybersecurity and consumer protection 
efforts will lead to achieving the ultimate goal of preventing 
data breaches in the first place so that consumers’ personal 
information is not stolen and in the hands of cybercriminals. 
B. A Federal Data Breach Notification Law 
The infamous Equifax data breach and the overall rise 
in data breaches has led to many lawmakers to call for a 
federal data breach law.371 Likewise, the recent passing of 
 
 370. See supra notes 366–67 and accompanying text. 
 371. See S. 2289 115th Cong. (2d Sess. 2018) (Senators Elizabeth Warren 
(Mass.) and Mark Warner (Va.) introduced the bill “Data Breach and 
Compensation Act” fining companies $100 for each consumer whose information 
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officials in a timely manner). See also S. 2197 115th Cong. (1st Sess. 2017) 
(Senators Richard Blumenthal (CT), Bill Nelson (FL), and Tammy Baldwin (WI) 
introduced a bill titled “Data Security and Breach Notification Act.” This bill 
would require, among other things, notification of the affected parties within 
thirty days and notification to law enforcement if the breach involves more than 
10,000 individuals); The Application Privacy, Protection, and Security Act of 
2018, H.R. 6547 115th Cong. (2018) (this law would govern how data is collected 
1204 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  67 
the GDPR and CCPA has led those in industry to call for a 
uniform federal privacy law to ease the compliance burden in 
the United States.372 Therefore, the United States Federal 
Government can follow the lead of the European Union and 
California by creating a comprehensive federal privacy law. 
The Federal Government can use the GDPR and CCPA as an 
example by adopting the successful provisions of those laws, 
while also improving upon the unsuccessful provisions that 
garnered significant criticism.373 
After analyzing American cybersecurity issues, as well 
as the GDPR and CCPA, there are five necessary provisions 
to be included in a U.S. federal privacy law. Accordingly, a 
U.S. federal privacy law must: (1) establish the data rights 
of all American citizens; (2) clearly define terms within the 
privacy law; (3) include a comprehensive data breach 
notification requirement; (4) truly be harmonized and 
 
and secured on mobile devices); The Data Care Act of 2018 S. 3744 115 Cong. (2d 
Sess. 2018) (Introduced by Senator Brian Schatz (Haw.), this bill would require 
companies to use reasonable care when collecting data and places restrictions on 
how data can be shared.). 
 372. See Dan Clark, A PLEA FOR PROTECTION; Will a federal data privacy 
law save the day?, CORP. COUNSEL (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.law.com/ 
corpcounsel/2019/02/04/a-plea-for-protection-will-a-federal-data-privacy-law-
save-the-day/?slreturn=20190609162321 (reporting that Intel, Alphabet Inc. 
(Google), and IBM have all weighed in on a federal privacy law in the United 
States); see also Cat Zakrzewski, The Technology 202: More than 200 companies 
are calling for a national privacy law. Here’s an inside look at their proposal, 




(stating that the Business Roundtable, a group of more than 200 retailers, tech 
companies, and financial institutions, call on the U.S. to adopt a national privacy 
law that would apply the same data collection requirements to all companies 
regardless of sector.); Tim Cook calls for US federal privacy law to tackle 
‘weaponized’ personal data, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 24, 2018), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/oct/24/tim-cook-us-federal-
privacy-law-weaponized-personal-data (stating that Apple’s CEO Tim Cook, 
Facebook’s CEO Mark Zuckerburg, and Google’s CEO Sundar Pichai, all support 
a federal privacy law in the U.S.). 
 373. See supra Section IV.B. 
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uniform across the United States; and (5) the law must have 
a reasonable and just penalty for noncompliance. By 
incorporating all five of these provisions in a federal privacy 
law, the United States will ensure that cybersecurity efforts 
in America are improved and consumers’ private information 
is better protected in the future. 
The first necessary provision for a U.S. federal privacy 
law is a provision establishing the data rights of all American 
citizens. Similar to the GDPR and CCPA, a U.S. federal 
privacy law needs to establish basic data rights for all of its 
citizens.374 At the very least, a federal privacy law should 
give U.S. residents the right to be informed as to how 
companies are using their personal information, the right to 
have their data amended or deleted, and ensure that their 
data is not being collected and shared without their 
consent.375 As a result, this provision will give Americans 
more freedom and control of their personal information 
before and after it is collected by an organization. 
Second, a federal privacy law must clearly define its 
terms. Namely, a U.S. federal privacy law must clearly 
define the term “personal information,” which is something 
the GDPR and CCPA failed to accomplish.376 This will make 
compliance with the law much less confusing and costly. 
Accordingly, this law will not drive out small and medium-
 
 374. See id. 
 375. See David Meyer, In the Wake of GDPR, Will the U.S. Embrace Data 
Privacy?, FORTUNE (Nov. 29, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/11/29/federal-data-
privacy-law/; see also Hearing on Protecting Consumer Privacy in the Era of Big 
Data Before the H. Comm. On Energy and Commerce and S. Comm. On Consumer 
Protection and Commerce, 116th Cong. (2019) (statement by Denise E. Zheng, 
Vice President, Technology and Innovation, Business Roundtable) (stating that 
at the heart of the Business Roundtable proposal is a set of core individual rights 
that they believe all consumers should have, including the right to transparency 
regarding a company’s data practices, consumers’ right to exert control over their 
data, the right to access and correct inaccuracies in personal data about them, 
and the right to delete personal data). 
 376. See supra notes 343–347 and accompanying text (explaining the issues 
with the GDPR and CCPA’s definition of “personal information”). 
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sized businesses with its large compliance costs. 
Additionally, a clear definition of personal information will 
enable organizations to continue to perform important 
privacy-protection practices. The second term that must be 
clearly defined in a U.S. federal privacy law is the term 
“business.”377 This will allow each business in America to 
know whether or not it must comply with the law. Again, this 
will lower compliance costs because organizations will know 
whether or not they must comply with the law and plan 
accordingly. In the aggregate, clearly defined terms in a U.S. 
federal data breach notification law will allow organizations 
to comply with the law in an efficient manner and ensure 
that consumers’ personal information is protected. 
Third, and arguably most importantly, a U.S. federal 
privacy law must have a comprehensive data breach 
notification provision. Taking from the GDPR, this data 
breach notification clause must have a time-limit requiring 
organizations to notify the proper authorities within seventy-
two hours of the breach.378 However, this provision would 
only require notification that the breach occurred and not 
require a full investigation yet. This will prevent a company 
and its executives from engaging in any bad behavior such 
as insider trading before the breach is made public.379 
Additionally, it will put the government on notice of the 
 
 377. See supra notes 341–42 and accompanying text (explaining the issues 
with the CCPA’s definition of “business”). 
 378. See supra pp. 1180–81 and accompanying notes (explaining the GDPR’s 
72-hour notification requirement); see also 23 NYCRR § 500.17 (This New York 
State Department of Financial Services regulation requires financial 
organizations to give notice to the New York State Superintendent of Financial 
Services within 72 hours of identifying that a cybersecurity event has occurred.). 
A federal data breach notification law mirroring these statutes would ensure that 
all consumers are informed of a data breach properly and reduce the ability for 
corporate executives to misbehave, such as by selling securities of a corporation 
before notifying the public of the breach. 
 379. See supra pp. 1152–53 and accompanying notes (discussing the 
investigation into Equifax’s executives for potential insider trading violations 
following the infamous 2017 breach). 
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breach, but not be overly burdensome for companies because 
they will not have to do a full investigation of the breach 
within just seventy-two hours. Therefore, following 
notification of the proper government authorities, an 
organization can do a full investigation into the breach with 
oversight from the government. 
Then, a U.S. federal privacy law must also incorporate a 
time-limit in which a company must notify the consumers 
affected by the breach. Congress can conduct research to 
determine the appropriate amount of time, but an analysis 
of the current state data breach notification laws shows that 
requiring notification within thirty days of a breach to 
affected consumers would be appropriate.380 This thirty-day 
time limit will give an organization ample time to conduct a 
full investigation. Additionally, this requirement will ensure 
that consumers are notified of a breach in a timely manner 
so they can take the proper steps to mitigate any losses and 
protect their personal information from further exposure to 
cybercriminals through credit freezes, credit monitoring, and 
the like.381 Combined, these two notification requirements 
will give government notice of a breach to police any bad 
behavior by the breached organization, as well as allow the 
organization to conduct a full investigation of the breach and 
then notify the affected individuals in a timely manner. 
The fourth requirement of a data breach notification 
provision in a U.S. federal privacy law would be a uniform 
manner in which individuals are notified. As such, a U.S. 
federal privacy law must be truly harmonized. The GDPR 
tried to harmonize the data privacy laws in the EU, but, as 
stated previously, the GDPR failed to do so.382 The United 
States should take this opportunity to create a uniform 
federal privacy law that will preempt the fifty separate state 
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privacy laws.383 As stated prior, the fifty separate data 
breach notification laws are a compliance nightmare for 
organizations in America.384 All fifty of these notification 
laws have different requirements for the manner in which 
organizations must notify individuals affected by a breach. A 
proposed solution is to require organizations to inform 
individuals affected by a breach via an email, phone call, and 
a letter in the mail. This will ensure that all affected 
individuals are notified of the breach because the majority of 
Americans utilize either email, physical letters, or 
telephones. In addition, an organization that experiences a 
security breach will no longer need to comply with fifty 
separate data breach notification laws, rather, it will only 
need to look to one federal privacy law for all of its 
notification requirements. Therefore, a truly harmonized 
federal privacy law will ease the compliance burdens for 
organizations and allow these organizations to focus on data 
protection rather than simply compliance with a vast 
amount of privacy laws.385 
Finally, the fifth requirement for a federal U.S. privacy 
law is that it must have a reasonable and just penalty for 
noncompliance. The penalty for violating a federal U.S. 
privacy law will act as a specific deterrent to organizations 
that violate the law.386 Specific deterrence refers to the 
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2019] EQUIFAX DATA BREACH 1209 
effects of enforcement against a particular violator on that 
violator’s future conduct.387 Applying specific deterrence to a 
federal privacy notification law would entail punishments on 
an organization for violating specific provisions of the law. 
Therefore, the punishment to a company for violating the 
U.S. federal privacy law would act as a specific deterrent to 
that violating organization. Specific deterrence would shape 
that violating company’s behavior to come into compliance 
with the law for fear of being penalized again. As a result, 
consumer personal information is better protected because 
this company is now in compliance with the law and properly 
protecting its customers’ data. 
However, the punishment for noncompliance with a 
federal U.S. privacy law cannot be so severe that it 
completely wipes out some businesses. With the GDPR’s 
fines starting at €10 million or €20 million depending on 
which article is violated, there is serious concern that these 
enormous fines could push small businesses out of the EU.388 
With 30.2 million small businesses in the United States, 
small businesses make up 99.9% of all business in the United 
States.389 Additionally, United States small businesses 
employed 58.9 million people, or 47.5% of the workforce, in 
 
from a data breach will act as a general deterrent and force organizations to 
improve their cybersecurity efforts to protect against a data breach. See also 
supra Section V.A. Whereas, a federal U.S. privacy law will act as a specific 
deterrent for companies, deterring them from violating the federal privacy law. 
 387. SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE, 8–9 (2010). Farhang explains that 
there is considerable evidence that private lawsuits are an effective tool in 
shaping the behavior of both private entities and governmental subunits. 
Farhang also notes the aspect of general and specific deterrence in affecting 
behavior. Specific deterrence is the “enforcement against a particular violator on 
that violator’s future conduct, while general deterrence refers to effects of visible 
enforcement in the legal environment on other would-be violators who have yet 
to actually be the targets of enforcement, and hope never to be.” 
 388. See supra notes 315–16 and accompanying text; see also supra note 325–
26 and accompanying text. 
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2015.390 Consequently, the U.S. economy cannot afford to 
have a fine so large that it pushes small businesses to 
bankruptcy.391 Thus, the U.S. federal privacy law must find 
the delicate balance when setting its fines so that it acts as a 
specific deterrent, but does not drive out small business in 
America. 
A proper solution would be to set a fine that is a 
percentage of the organization’s revenue. The GDPR’s fines 
in Article 83 are a percentage of an organization’s revenues, 
but only if that fine would be greater than €10 or €20 million, 
depending on the violation. The United States can improve 
upon Article 83 of the GDPR by setting the fines for 
violations of a federal U.S. privacy law at a fixed percentage 
of an organization’s revenues. By using a percentage of 
revenue approach rather than a massive fine like the GDPR, 
a U.S. privacy law can act as a specific deterrent to 
companies but will not drive them out of business. A 
percentage of revenue approach will achieve this purpose 
because the fine will then be a sliding scale depending on the 
size of the business that violated the U.S. federal privacy 
law.392 Therefore, by setting fines as a percentage of an 
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organization’s revenues, a U.S. federal privacy law can both 
act as a specific deterrent to shape a business’ future 
behavior, but not be so drastic that it drives small businesses 
out of the industry. 
CONCLUSION 
In today’s digital age, data breaches have become 
commonplace. In 2017, there were a record high 1,579 data 
breaches,393 with the most damaging data breach being the 
Equifax data breach in the summer of 2017.394 Although the 
American legal system currently does not have enough 
protections for consumers in place, the Equifax data breach 
presents an opportunity to improve consumer protection in 
America. Accordingly, following the Equifax breach, 
lawmakers have already proposed legislation to improve 
consumer protection.395 
However, this Comment argues that there are two 
distinct steps that can be made within the legal community 
to improve consumer protection. First, the Supreme Court 
can rule on Article III standing in a data breach case and 
clearly state that risk of future harm from a data breach 
constitutes an injury-in-fact under Article III.396 This will 
allow victims of a data breach to have their day in court with 
a class action lawsuit and deter companies from failing to put 
into place proper cybersecurity protections for their 
customers’ valuable personal information. Second, a federal 
privacy law will ensure that those affected by a data breach 
are properly notified of the breach in a timely manner.397 A 
federal law with appropriate fines for noncompliance will 
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also act as a specific deterrent for companies to ensure that 
they comply with the law. This will ensure that victims of a 
breach are notified in a timely manner and allow them to 
make the appropriate accommodations to protect themselves 
from further harm. 
Overall, cybersecurity is a complex and new area of the 
law. As Dwight Schrute said, identity theft is “not a joke” and 
it’s time America took it seriously.398 Data breaches pose a 
significant threat to consumers, affecting their personal and 
financial security. The severity of data breaches requires 
society and the law to adapt accordingly and ensure that 
consumers are protected. If the proper steps are taken, the 
American legal system can provide proper protection for its 
citizens. 
 
Editor’s Note: This Comment was selected from our 2017–18 
Note & Comment competition. Simultaneous with its 
publishing, the Federal Trade Commission announced that it 
reached a settlement of approximately $700 million with 
Equifax in relation to the 2017 Equifax data breach. For more 
information regarding this settlement, see the Federal 
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